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Chapter One
Introduction

1.1. El Lemby and Heen Maysara: Challenging Middle Class Normativity

In 2002, the actor Mohamed Saad (1965- present) starred in a movie called ‘El
Lemby’. He presented a caricaturist profile of a poor popular quarter dweller who cannot
find appropriate work to earn his living and goes through many failing attempts to
overcome his troubled situation. The film was the biggest box-office of the year and
continued to be shown in movie theatres for seventeen consecutive weeks accumulating
unprecedented revenues of twenty two million Egyptian pounds 1. In 2004, a sequel of the
movie was released (‘Elly Baly Balak’) and earned similar success (eighteen million
pounds in twenty four weeks) 2. Saad became the top-rated Egyptian superstar of his time
and his surprising success rendered the character of the popular quarter dweller an
extremely attractive one for other actors. Following El Lemby, many films about people
living in informal urban expansions that surround and infiltrate the Egyptian capital
emerged. With a prominent sarcastic style, the series of movies treating dramatic stories
occurring in ashwaiyyat 3 became a recurrent element of the Egyptian cinema market 4. El
Lemby and the rest of the popular heroes were generously received by the audience that
imitated their manners and repeated their cynical comments.
El Lemby (part 1) was however aggressively criticized in official and independent
media discourses in Egypt. Except for few supportive critics, the film was perceived as a
low-rank fragmented plot that distorts the reality of the poor dwelling in ashwaiyy
1

. Hammond, Andrew 2007. Popular Culture in the Arab World: Arts, Politics and the Media. Cairo:
American University Press in Cairo. Pp. 137- 158.
2
. www.Egyfilm.com (Egyptian database of Arab films), November 2008.
3
. Ashwaiyyat, the plural for ashwaiyya (literally meaning ‘half- hazard’) is the term used in public to refer
to the informal housing communities that emerged in the seventies as urban expansions of Cairo and
continued to infiltrate the Egyptian capital until now (Bayat and Denis, 2000). The word bears connotations
of poverty, disorganization and vulgarity of the dwellers as the imagery permeates public discourse. It is
usually used to stress the distinction between civic quarters for the middle and upper classes and haphazard
quarters for the poor and marginalized classes.
4
. Starting in 2002, Egyptian cinema presented around twenty six movies depicting lives in ashwaiyyat and
narrating the stories of heroes dwelling in them. Scriptwriters like Belal Fadl, Nasser Abd Al Rahman and
Ahmed El Beih wrote the majority of these films like ‘Saye’e Bahr’ (2002) , ‘El Lemby’ (2002) and ‘Elly
Baly Balak’ (2003), ‘Haha We Tofaha’ (2005), ‘Heya Fawda’ and ‘Heen Maysara’ 2007, ‘Bolteya Al
Ayma’ (2008).

9

quarters by portraying them as ignorant and incoherent subjects. The discrepancy
between the film revenues and the harsh criticism in TV programs and newspapers was
quiet obvious, yet, confusing.
In 2007, ‘Heen Maysara’ (Whenever it’s possible), a movie written by Nasser
Abd Al Rahman (1960- present) and directed by Khaled Youssef

5

(1965- present)

reflected on the miserable reality of ashwaiyyat. Abd Al Rahman scrutinized the reality
survived in a poor neighborhood, although he did not insist on presenting the mannerisms
and language of its dwellers as a comic material, though his script included characters
that were very similar (in the broad lines and style) to El Lemby. These characters’
language and sarcasm sounded bitterer and not laughable, especially when placed in the
dramatic context of the movie.
This tragic representation raised even more criticism. The film tackled sensitive
issues about how these quarters function, the nature of sexual relations therein, and how
their inhabitants relate to the police and other state officials. Youssef presented a
pessimistic representation where a horrific moral decomposition and an obvious
corruption and impunity were the basic rule. This image that seemed to be beyond the
expectations of the majority of cinema audience in Egypt ignited a harsh criticism, to the
extent that members of the Egyptian parliament and Al-Azhar professors discussed
banning the film 6.
In many critical readings of Heen Maysara the characters stimulated fear and
sadness rather than laughter. Samir Farid, the well-known cinema critic argued: “the
middle and upper middle class viewers for the first time watched a touching drama about
Ashwaiyyat and witnessed how the reality of these people is unbelievably cruel and
inhumane” 7. Youssef and Abd Al Rahman courageously presented prostitution, incest,
promiscuity, and rape as daily patterns of sexual relations in ashwaiyyat. They tried to
clarify the suffocating economic and social conditions behind these comportments and
how those people were obliged to accept humiliation and authorize debauchery for
reasons related to their class position and their economic situation.
5

. An Egyptian director known for his socialist inclinations. Some of his films depict the social reality of
the poor and marginalized strata in contemporary Egyptian society.
6
.http://www.aksalser.com/?page=view_news&id=24793128973a465f1930eed64f4ed57b&ar=810200570.
November 2008.
7
. Al Ryad newspaper. December 2007.
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Moreover, one of the radical steps that Heen Maysara’s producers took was their
conscious attempt to confront the audience with the nature of the relationship between the
characters of the film (or ashwaiyyat residents) and the Egyptian security apparatus. The
film discussed Baltaga (thuggery) in ashwaiyyat as an essential behavior reinforced and
encouraged by state officers. The film detailed how corrupt relations involved policemen,
criminals and popular quarters’ thugs in a network that structured daily life in Egypt at
large. Youssef in Heen Maysara exposed the interdependency between state personnel
and ashwaiyyat dwellers, demonstrating how they share the public space according to
hierarchical power relations. This representation of power relations between the
inhabitants of ashwaiyyat, the state and the middle and upper classes implicitly accused
the more powerful (state as well as upper and middle classes) of perpetuating the
humiliation and poverty of the disenfranchised. Youssef contended:
“Heen Maysara underpins the class discriminatory bases of such interdependency
and the nature of exploitation of those people by turning them into thugs and
criminals. The criminality in this case is deployed to empower the corrupt rulers
and instate the rule of impunity and chaos.” 8

1.2. Research Concerns and Questions

In this research, I examine the connections between such representations in
contemporary Egyptian cinema and the sociopolitical reality which they document and of
which they are part during 2002-2008. I focus on this time frame because of the
expanding production of Egyptian films depicting ashwaiyyat and their dwellers. I argue
that the systematic and repetitive focus on ashwaiyyat residents symbolizes an equivalent
presence and influence of ashwaiyyat on the public sphere. In other words, the depictions
in the films are the norm, rather than an anomaly. Representation in fiction, as Achille
Mbembe 9 claims, is part of the construction of “the normal” and thus endowed with
creating a “true narrative.” Mbembe assumes that a true narrative is “the narrative that
possesses an ability to get believed as true because it rests on a system of belief and

8

. Interview with Khaled Youssef. Ehna magazine (April 2009).
. Mbembe, Achille. 2001. “The Thing and Its Doubles” In On the Postcolony. Berkeley: University of
California Press. Pp. 159- 160.

9
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acquires a mimetic and allegorical relation to the reality in addition to the familiarity and
plausibility between the narrative and the everyday experience.” 10
In the 1980s and 1990s ashwaiyyat inhabitants, as Salwa Ismail argues, were
systematically removed and excluded from the prevalent social discourses. According to
Ismail, they were usually talked about as a “potential threat to the middle class either as
religious extremists or criminal thugs.” 11 In the same vein, the state was represented as
the guardian of the people and the nation working hard to eliminate the threat of
ashwaiyyat from the public domain, and symbolically denying their presence in public
discourse, particularly in official media 12. The increased representation of ashwaiyyat in
cinema, I argue, signifies the inevitability of including them in realistic cinematic
productions. Given the shifts in power relations, violence and chaotic conditions that
permeate life in almost all the quarters in Egypt, excluding ashwaiyyat was no longer a
possibility. My thesis examines the conditions that made this shift possible as well as the
effect of these productions and reactions thereto on the construction of social order in
Egypt.
In my ethnography, I contend that in the films the representation of vulgarity,
authorized violence, and criminality as traits confined to ashwayiyat appealed to a fair
number of middle class audience. 13 I further argue that such a tolerance may indicate a
serious change in the ways violence and force are practiced in Egypt by both the state and
its subjects. It also refers to a different perception of the law institution and the
regulations that govern the public sphere and the social interaction in the period 20022008. My argument in this respect is that the institutions entrusted and charged with the
regulation of social interaction and the legitimate use of violence, have faced a drastic
moral and structural collapse since the 1990s. This collapse, which hinders the
performance of their roles, disseminates a generalized air of chaos. By the turn of the 21st
century these conditions found articulation in cinema and other media productions.

10

. Ibid. P. 163.
. Ismail, Salwa 2006. Political Life in Cairo’s New Quarters. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press.
12
. Ibid, 2006.
13
. ‘El Lemby’ was the biggest box- office hit in Arab cinema in 2002 and continued to be shown in
theatres for seventeen weeks with unprecedented revenues of twenty two million Egyptian pounds
(Egyfilm.com).
11
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The ruling regime (that took over since the military coup 1952) has undergone
changes in its conception and its force deployment. Discourses perpetuated by ruling
elites justify their repressive practices and legitimize the use of violence against its
national subjects. This “police project of the government,” 14 as Ismail refers to it,
assumes the survival and security of state agents and allies as its first priority. Security, in
this sense, is guaranteed by attacking freedom of expression and democratic processes of
succession to and holding of power. However, guaranteeing “security” has not been
always an easy task. Preserving despotic rule in Egypt for six successive decades required
recourse to conventional and unconventional mechanisms of control and techniques of
governance.
Michel- Rolph Trouillot 15 distinguishes between a conventional dictatorship and
an unconventional dictatorship that “deploys different mechanisms to bring its abuse of
power to unprecedented limits.” Focusing on the way the Duvaliers in Haiti solidified
their dictatorship 1957-1964, Trouillot identifies a set of processes that induced a
qualitative change in the nature of Duvaliers’ authoritarianism. In my thesis, I build on
his analysis in an attempt to examine transformations in state mechanisms in Egypt in the
2000s. To demonstrate such shifts in the nature of governance and violence, I rely on
other studies, reports of international organizations and newspapers accounts which
document these aggressive transformations.
Additionally, I unpack such transformations in power and violence by examining
how they are depicted in the films, particularly in the way the state is represented in “El
Lemby” and “Heen Maysar,a” and how state agents practice violence and deploy power
viz. a viz. subordinated and marginalized subjects. In my analysis of media productions, I
explore thus how El Lemby and Heen Maysara delve into the magnitude and effects of
governance on people smashed by the relentless censorship of a coercive security
apparatus. The people of ashwaiyyat as portrayed in the two movies are part and parcel of
an entire social structure shaped by despotic rule and its concomitant effect of
disorganization, violence and chaos. However, the two films stress the confinement of
14

. Ismail, Salwa 2006. Political Life in Cairo’s New Quarters. University of Minnesota Press. Pp. 63- 67.
. Trouillot, Michel- Rolph. 1990. “State against Nation” In Haiti: State against Nation, the Origins and
Legacy of Duvalierism. New York: Monthly Review Press. Pp. 163- 185.

15
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this disorganization to ashwaiyyat and thus reproduce the dominant discourses about
ashwaiyyat’s potential threat to the established upper and middle classes. Such
representations, I argue, produce the effect of a subconscious neutralization of the actual
and daily violence practiced by the state against all its subjects regardless of their class
positions. Ultimately, such productions legitimize ‘class racism’ and societal aggression
against ashwaiyyat as an acceptable and normative reaction, displacing thuggery and
criminality as inherent exclusively in ashwaiyyat.
1.3. Research Question: Is Chaos Reducible to the Imaginary Boundaries of
Ashwaiyyat?

In this research project, I aim at presenting a cultural study that analyzes the
phenomena of Egyptian commercial films which depicted ashwaiyyat and their dwellers
as their main theme (2000- present), a focus that constitutes a remarkable subversion of
the cinematic tradition in Egypt. With a special focus on two films “El Lemby” 2002 and
“Heen Maysara” 2007, my research illuminates the sociopolitical context that influences
the cinematic representation of the poor classes on the big screen. I argue that a
substantial transformation in cinematic representation was influenced by the broader
sociopolitical and economic context. Principally, I assess middle class sensibilities about
the relation between the ruling elite, the state and its subjects as represented in the films.
The focus on representing the poor and marginalized subjects who dwell in slum areas in
the late media productions is underpinned, in my opinion, by a change in the way the
Egyptian state produces its image as the guardian of the masses, legitimately using
violence toward all undesirable and threatening elements of society.
Such a change can be attributed to an unprecedented tension in the state/citizen
relationship in contemporary Egypt under the rule of Mubarak (1981- present). This
relation is emphasized in the films by elaborating on the themes of social exclusion,
societal (unauthorized) violence and the public brutalization of subjects by Egyptian state
representatives. This thesis is questioning whether violence and social exclusion are
confined to the boundaries of poor and informal localities or rather they represent
experiences that extend way beyond the geographies of ashwaiyyat.
14

I chose to focus ethnographically on the middle class’ reactions to the films.
Given the theoretical limitations of a definitive definition and delineation of middle class
in Egypt particularly at present, a theme I discuss later, my selection of interviewees
included a diversified group of people that share and position themselves within the
public sphere as “middle class” claiming a variety of class markers ranging from cultural
background, education, income, profession and location. This choice is based on two
fundamental assumptions. First, the Egyptian middle class has been part and parcel of all
the dominant social discourses including cinema (particularly those produced by the
postcolonial Egyptian state) that prevailed after the military coup in 1952. In such
discourses the middle classes occupied the central role as the beholders as well as the
main agents of modernization of the Egyptian nation 16. The hegemony of these social
discourses naturalized in the social imaginary the moralities, sensibilities and modes of
practice of the middle class as the most appropriate and accepted/aspired to social
comportment.
Second, this thesis offers a re-reading of the films depicting ashwaiyyat in relation
to media discourses about the shrinkage of the middle class as a result of the
implementation of neoliberal programs in Egypt starting from the 1990s. My research is
principally concerned with how representations in media productions are both influential
in the formulation of hegemonic public discourses and reflective of prevailing public
debates. My aim is to delineate the complex relationship between the representation of
ashwaiyyat inhabitants in the contemporary Egyptian commercial cinema and the
sociopolitical reality that perpetuates their exclusion and further destruction.
In my analysis I map out two principal dimensions. First, how these
representations capitalize on exposing the state/subjects relationship where violence and
vulgarity are symptoms of the longevity of a postcolonial despotic system. Second, how
the process of representation contributes to the reproduction and the perpetuation of
inequitable class conditions in Egypt that ultimately reinforce the polarization of classes
into an extravagantly rich class and an intolerably poor one. In this respect, my study
16

. Younis, Sherif. (2005). Al Zahf al-Mouqads: Mothaharat al-Tanahyi wa Tashakoul ‘Abadat Nasser
(The Sacred March: the Abdication Demonstrations and the Formulation of Nasser’s Worship). Cairo: Dar
Merit.
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attempts to challenge the falsified perception of ashwaiyyat as the dwellings of
marginalized groups of poor, vulgar and ignorant people who pursue their lives in a
distant space disconnected from the rest of the refined areas of Cairo. In this respect, I
intend to map out a blurring of boundaries between the middle and lower class ethos and
practices in the actual contemporary context.
It is noticeable in the last decade that Egyptian cinema repetitively portrayed nonmiddle class heroes who inhabit ashwaiyyat. 17 The heroes were shown as extremely poor
and behaving in a vulgar manner that was considered striking yet appealing to the
majority of the audience of movie theaters. 18 My aim while writing the ethnography of
the two films “El Lemby” and “Heen Maysara” is to provide a thick description of the
films and unpack how members of the middle class relate to the chaotic and disorganized
worlds exposed to them.
While attempting to bridge the gap between description and fieldwork in media
studies, 19 I will demonstrate how the politics of representation implied in the two films
(as ethnographic sites) reproduce the harsh distinctions prevailing in the social imaginary
about the middle and lower classes. Moreover, I will decipher how these films introduce
the notions of violence and impunity both as a systematized state comportment and an
internalized individual mode of behavior across classes.

17

. Hammond, Andrew 2007. Popular Culture in the Arab World: Arts, Politics and the Media. Cairo:
American University Press in Cairo. Pp. 137-158.
18
. Different newspapers criticized “El Lemby” as part of the revival of the Egyptian cinema with ‘lowculture’ blockbuster comedies but that nevertheless had tapped into a desire among the burgeoning
younger generation for new faces and films that deal with the realities of today’s youth (Hammond 2007:
139).
19
. See for instance Patrick D. Murphy and Marwan M. Kraidy (2003). “Towards an Ethnographic
Approach to Global Media Studies” in Patrick D. Murphy and Marwan M. Kraidy (eds). Global Media
Studies: Ethnographic Perspectives. Routledge Taylor 61 Francis Grnup NEW YORK AND LONDON.
P.5- 19.
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Chapter Two
Overview of Literature and Methodological Approach
2.1. Introduction
In this dissertation, I address contemporary Egyptian film productions during
2002-2008. I aspire to write an ethnography of the two films ‘Heen Maysara’ (2007) and
‘El Lemby’ (2002) by situating them first within the broad sociopolitical context of
Egypt, and second, by focusing on readings by members of the middle classes of the two
films. This endeavor is not based on a reception study of the entire middle class. Rather, I
provide an ethnographic reading of the films relying on interviews with viewers and
producers, content analysis of discourses published in newspapers and magazines
covering the period 2002-2008, in addition to an analysis of the two films. My aim is to
assess middle class sensibilities and discourses about ashwayiyat and their dwellers. I
consider the two films as my principal ethnographic sites which offer an interpretation of
ashwaiyyat and the sociopolitical relations in Egypt that I examine in relation to analyses
of the time regarding the same theme. I consider the sociopolitical context of Egypt –
particularly the presence of the ruling political regime in the everyday life of its citizens –
as cornerstone in this research. Therefore, I examine how the films reflect on
state/citizens relationship in ashwaiyyat spaces. I juxtapose such a representation in
relation to how the middle class participants in my research reacted to it. My essential
argument in this respect is that a similar relation of violence, chaos and precariousness
already prevails between the state and its middle class subjects; however, members of the
middle class deny such a relationship and displace it onto the dwellers of ashwaiyyat.
My argument is premised on and informed by theoretical frameworks that situate
Egypt within postcolonial Africa. This classification is organically important to my
research for two reasons. First, the ruling Egyptian regime shares essential criteria of the
postcolonial regimes and adopts similar perception of power and authoritarianism as
described in the analyses of postcolonial scholars in and about Africa, particularly with
regard to state/citizen relationships. Second, I contend that the middle class shares a
17

position analogous to that of the lower classes to the state, given the despotic nature of
governance that prevails. Both groups (i.e. middle and lower classes) are subjected to
chaotic behavior instated and perpetuated by the state machinery, compounded by a rule
of impunity on part of state functionaries and their allies. My argument is informed by the
works of Achille Mbmbe in Cameroon 20 and Johannes Fabian in Congo 21, who produced
ethnographic accounts of public culture and media productions while detailing the
coloniality of power in postcolonial formations, the chaotic nature of rule, and the erosion
of legal recourse and rule of law.
My analysis attempts thus to synthesize two bodies of literature. The first is
concerned with processes of representation, especially in mass media, and its integral role
in producing and reproducing knowledge about social reality. The second is the
conception of state formation and the techniques of its power and control on the everyday
practice of its subjects. There I delineate the limitations of the frameworks classifying the
Egyptian state as a Middle Eastern polity versus the frameworks I am using to understand
the contemporary Egyptian state as a postcolonial formation in Africa. I argue in this
thesis that the founding essences of the state legacy in Egypt imply dimensions that were
better articulated in the academic discourse about the postcolonial African states and
were ignored by Middle East theorists.

2.2. Representations as ‘Regimes of Truth’
Introduction

In this reading of two media productions as representations of the contemporary
social reality in Egypt, my analysis is informed by a conception of representation as a
process that cannot be simply considered as permutations that re-interpret and reproduce
practices and ideas available in social institutions and cultural discourses. In contrast,
representation contributes to the production of knowledge and the construction of new
discourses about social reality. In other words, representation in artistic production
20 . Mbembe, Achille. 2001. On the Postcolony. Berkeley: University of California Press.
21 . Fabian, Johannes. 1998. Moments of Freedom: Anthropology and Popular Culture. Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia.
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possesses an agency in formulating knowledge about certain practices and structuring the
social response and activities accordingly. Pierre Bourdieu elaborates on this dialectical
process of production and reception of social knowledge through representation:
“… and in particular all knowledge of the social world, is an act of construction
implementing schemes of thought and expression, and that between conditions of
existence and practices or representations there intervenes the structuring activity
of the agents, who, far from reacting mechanically to mechanical stimulations,
respond to the invitations or threats of a world whose meaning they have helped
to produce” 22
Building on this idea, I will focus on the theoretical frameworks highlighting the
cultural and social backgrounds that nurture and inspire the actual practice and create an
arena of representation to confer meaning on such practices. The relation between
practices and representations cannot be studied separately from their socio- cultural
context, language and discourse, social codes of behavior and power relations. In this
respect, I find Michel Foucault’s identification of media images and representations as
‘regimes of truth’ crucial:
“Each society has its regimes of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the
types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, the mechanisms
and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means
by which each one is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in
the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what
counts as true” 23
Social practice cannot be regarded as a closed circle of actions that possess an
autonomous will and influence. Theorists like Stuart Hall view representation as the
process that mediates the transition of social practice from the direct and limited space of
occurrence to the broad universe of meanings and interpretations. It comprises a set of
tools and vehicles that produce meaning and formulate cultural discourses, which in turn
produce and influence practice 24. Stuart Hall defines representation as follows:,

22

. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press. P. 467.
23
. Foucault, Michel. 1980. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972- 1977, ed.
Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon.
24
. Hall, S. 1997. ‘The work of representation’ in Hall, S, et al. (eds.) Representation: Cultural
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“Representation is an essential part of the process by which meaning is produced and
exchanged between members of a culture. It involves the use of language, signs and
images which stand for or represent things” 25. He further stresses that there are two
systems of representation. The first is a system by which all sorts of objects, people and
events are correlated with a set of concepts or mental representations without which we
cannot interpret the world meaningfully. This system operates mainly on a mental level
and is not dependent on individual concepts, but on different ways of organizing,
clustering, arranging and classifying concepts and of establishing complex relations
between them. This system is closely related to the perception of culture as a constitutive
process that implies a set of practices ingrained in a collective matrix of concepts and
interpretations.
The second system of representation in Hall’s definition is language. Language,
in his words, is not confined to words or phrases, but it is all the signs (visual, auditory,
facial expressions, movements, and images) that translate sets of relations dwelling in the
thought process into expressive meanings and ways of communication that people share.
It is the practical element of representation that transforms objects in our minds into
communicable experiences and practices which shape and affect identity. Hall explains
the interrelation between these two systems of representation as follows:
“At the heart of the meaning process in culture, then, are two related systems of
representation. The first enables us to give meaning to the world by constructing a
set of correspondences or a chain of equivalences between things- people, objects,
events, abstract ideas, etc. - and our system of concepts, our conceptual maps. The
second depends on constructing a set of correspondences between our conceptual
map and a set of signs, arranged or organized into various languages which stand
for or represent those concepts. The relation between ‘things’, concepts and signs
lies at the heart of the production of meaning in language. The process which
links these three elements together is what we call representation” 26
In my ethnography, I explored how media productions get influenced while
building the characters, the dialogue and the dramatic sequence by prevalent social
structures and discourses. Analyzing the debates around both movies, I found Hall’s
systems of representations (meaning and language) analytically useful in decoding the
25
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signs inscribed in the drama from different positions of reception. For example, I found
the receptive audience in my middle class sample of critics and viewers greatly
influenced by the prevalent discourses about ashwaiyyat in the official media. In other
instances, I identified reactions that critically engaged with these dominant structures and
provided an unconventional reading of the drama in the movies. I also relied on the
literature of cultural studies that tackled the relation between the audience and media
productions, particularly British cultural studies and authors like John Fiske, Michelle
Byers and Diana Fuss to interpret these diversified positions of interpretation. In their
works, the former authors stress the active engagement of the audience in decoding the
media representation. Yet, they affirm that such engagement happens in the very
discursive patterns where the viewer and the text intersect dialectically all through the
process of reception.

2.2.1. Viewers and Representations: Reading the Relationship?

In my thesis I analyze contemporary media productions in relation to the
sociopolitical context to understand the dialectical relationship between them. I argue that
the receptive audience is definitively part of this context/social reality and the agent
through which the social practices and their representation keep feeding each other. I
focus on media productions and analyze the positionality of the viewers while they
consume mass media. Elizabeth Seymour depicts how the viewers relate to the ‘regimes
of truth’ embedded in the media production texts:
“For example, some of these ‘regimes of truth’ within a given text would include
the way that characters are created and portrayed, the moral issues that are raised
within the storyline, the logic and sense of plausibility of the storyline and
characters, and the social messages and critiques that are presented to the
viewer” 27
Focusing on these dimensions while analyzing the reactions of a diversified
middle class sample of viewers of Heen Maysara and El Lemby, I examine how the
relation of the viewers to media representations conveys projections on their own lives
27
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and the social world. Despite their belief that representations are not identical to reality,
viewers engage with the discourses and connotations implied in the movies believing that
these narratives negotiate their social reality and reproduce a ‘truthful’ statement about it.
Theorists of British cultural studies like Fiske 28 and Hall 29 essentialized the active
engagement of the audience in encoding and decoding the message of the dramatic texts
in the process of representation. They argue that it is impossible to separate messages
from meanings, and hence re- situated ‘audience’ as a central focus of analysis in cultural
studies. They claim that mass media provides audiences with ways of seeing and
interpreting their world, helping them ultimately to shape their very existence and
participation in society 30. However, there are no easy answers for the questions about the
mechanisms through which viewers’ mental structures operate in relation to the media
representations. Positionality implies complex categories; gender, class, space,
profession, self image and personal histories. Byers assumes that a certain amount of
flexibility allows diversified reactions of rejection or acceptance: “I believe that the
spectators exist in a relationship to the texts they view that is neither entirely open or
entirely closed. Rather, the relationship between spectator and text is always situational,
contingent and shifting” 31.
I presume that the viewers approach media representations through three main
trajectories that complement each other. The first is the reflective or mimetic approach
which postulates that meaning is thought to lie in the object, person, idea or event in the
real world. Representation, in this sense, functions like a mirror, to reflect the true
meaning as it already exists in the world 32. The reflective approach s influenced by the
Marxist and Frankfurt school theorists, who stipulate that the message carried by media
productions is the key unit of cultural meaning, which reflects society’s dominant
28
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ideologies and that is delivered directly to the popular consciousness 33. Theodor Adorno
postulates that capitalism is ‘an objective totality of social relations’ where a chain of
intermediary social

convictions

intervene

indirectly

to

produce

the

cultural

34

superstructure . He alleges that the direct relation between the base and the
superstructure that produces mass media productions only exists through complex
relations where a set of social discourses are expressed. Art works, in this sense, are
expected to reflect the nature of this totality of social relations not a single organ of it like
a certain class for example.
The second approach is the intentional approach that presumes that it is the
speaker, the author, who imposes his or her unique meaning on the world through
language and that words mean what the author intends they should mean. However, the
intentional approach is not enough to understand language and meaning as constantly
related to their media of production and context of reception. This approach denies the
possibility for the reception process to produce meaning. Based on my research, I argue
that the production of meaning cannot be simplified and reduced to a single author. On
contrary it is a complex process that includes several members sharing this
communicative experience. The process of reception decodes the messages of the artistic
productions from a certain position. According to Bourdieu, class position provides
recipients of art with the codes of interpretation suitable to their inherited dispositions or
‘habitus’. Bourdieu argues habitus:
“… is constructed as the generative formula which makes it possible to account
both for the classifiable practices and products and for the judgments, themselves
classified, which make these practices and works into a system of distinctive
signs” 35.
In this sense, the process of reception is part of the social construction and reproduction
of class distinctions where the natural taste for artistic productions is previously
appropriated according to class position.
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The third approach, the constructive approach, perceives representation from a
constructionist position of analysis and asserts that meaning is not naturally existent, it is
constructed. Using the representational systems identified by Hall, meaning is mobilized
from its material world to a symbolic world of concepts and signs. Through the linguistic
system, symbolic practices and processes operate to convey meaning to the material
world and help social actors to communicate about that world meaningfully to others 36.
The works of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure and Roland Barthes further
investigated how these systems of representation operate and incarnate a dense body of
meanings and connotations for the viewers to encode and decode.
De Saussure distinguished between two levels of operation of language as a
system of signs, and divided the sign into two elements. The first is the signifier which is
the ‘form’ or the actual practice that signifies (the image, the actual word, photo...). The
second element is ‘the signified’ which is the idea or concept with which the form is
associated. Both elements are essential in the production of meaning but marking the
difference between them is crucial to allow for analysis that does not assume fixed
meanings, rather open representation to the constant play or slippage of meaning.
Jonathan Culler elaborates on Saussure’s differentiation arguing:
“Language sets up an arbitrary relation between signifiers of its own choosing on
one hand, and signifieds of its own choosing on the other. Not only does each
language produce a different set of signifiers, articulating and dividing the
continuum of sound (or writing or drawing or photography) in a distinctive way;
each language produces a different set of signifieds; it has a distinctive and thus
arbitrary way of organizing the world into concepts and categories” 37.
Asserting this arbitrariness, Culler emphasizes that there is no universal true
meaning as the sign is constantly subjected to the history and the particular moment
where the signifier and a certain signified combine and make meaning, i.e. it is always
contingent shaped by the historical process 38. By emphasizing that meaning is changeable
and contextual, interpretation becomes the focal point of analysis viewing it as the active
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process by which meaning is given and taken. Hall elaborates: “Every signifier given or
encoded with meaning has to be meaningfully interpreted or decoded by the receiver.” 39
Roland Barthes further develops the notion of ‘sign’ and links it to broader
cultural thematics and concepts. He differentiates between a descriptive level
‘denotation’ of the material or the actual practice and a wider level ‘connotation’ where
practice is decoded by connecting it to ‘wider realms of social ideology’. Barthes states:
“This second, wider meaning is no longer a descriptive level of obvious
interpretation. This second level of significance is more general, global and
diffuse. It deals with fragments of an ideology… These signifieds have a very
close communication with culture, knowledge, history and it is through them, so
to speak, that the environmental world (of the culture) invades the system (of
representation).” 40
This connection that Barthes establishes by identifying connotation liberates the
definitions of meaning and representation from language as a closed static system.
Representation thus is viewed as a source of production of social knowledge, “a more
open system, connected in more intimate ways with social practices and questions of
power.” 41 In the coming section, I will decipher the relation between media
representations as agents in the formulation of social discourses and relations of power.

2. 2. 2. The Microphysics of Power and State Representation

One of the essential aspects of this research is analyzing the symbolic power that
the media productions possess and the extent to which representations participate in the
formulation of dominant discourses and the shaping of the social imaginary. The question
of power, as deployed in my research, on the one hand refers to the nation state and to the
power relations prevalent in the sociopolitical domain which influence the social
practices and strategies of survival and/or resistance against the control of that state. I
will elaborate in the coming paragraphs on the mechanisms through which the construct
39
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of the state operates in the everyday life. I contend that media representations in Heen
Maysara and El Lemby portrayed these mechanisms and micro-processes and provided a
ground to engage critically with the issue of the powerful presence of the Egyptian state
in the everyday life of its citizens. A large segment of the feedback I collected about the
films related to the negotiation of the state imagery in the contemporary times and
perceived the chaotic patterns of performance and expression in both films as a
reproduction of the grotesque in and of state performance.
Michel Foucault argues that the techniques of governmentality are maximally
invested in state institutions 42. Yet, Foucault challenges the traditional postulates about
power as a vertical axis radiating in a single direction from top to bottom and coming
from a specific source (the sovereign, the state, the ruling class, etc…), he states: ”Power
does not function in the form of a chain- it circulates. It is never monopolized by one
centre. It is deployed and exercised through a net- like organization” 43. Foucault also
presumes that we are all caught in these networks, oppressors and oppressed:
“Power relations permeate all levels of social existence and are therefore to be
found operating at every site of social life- in the private spheres of the family and
sexuality as much as in the public spheres of politics, the economy and the law” 44.
Mitchell Dean, relying on Foucault’s perspective, elaborates on the mechanism by
which the state diffuses its power into the social body:
“Power is dispersed and in a sense has no center. It is inscribed in the social
relations and operates by means of techniques and instruments that penetrate the
social body. In analytical terms, the focus on microprocesses of power is designed
to crystallize the dispersion and penetration mechanisms of power into the nooks
and crannies of the social body” 45.
Through these micro-processes, the state deploys its techniques of governance to achieve
control and instate its concrete presence in the social consciousness. Foucault maps out
how power relations operate within the framework of minor practices exercised by larger
structures like the state or the dominant classes. He claims that there are localized
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circuits, tactics, mechanisms and effects through which power circulates- what Foucault
calls the ‘meticulous rituals’ or the ‘microphysics’ of power 46.
The lower levels of social practices, for Foucault, should not be regarded as
simple projections of the central power, but as the discursive practices produced in a
certain historical and cultural context. The interpretation of these practices takes into
consideration the historicity and the discourses that prevailed at their time of occurrence.
In Foucault’s theoretical framework practices are organized and acquire meanings
within respective discourses. Later, the practices inscribed in this discourse become
objects of knowledge. Foucault identified six elements included in the process of
construction of discourses around a certain topic: First, statements that provide
knowledge about this topic. Second, rules that prescribe certain ways of talking and
govern what is ‘sayable’ or ‘thinkable’ about this topic. Third, subjects that personify the
discourse (for example, the madman in discourse about madness). Fourth, the way by
which this knowledge about that topic acquires authority and a sense of embodying the
truth. Fifth, the practice within institutions for dealing with the subjects whose conduct is
regulated and organized according to this knowledge (e.g. punishment regimes for the
guilty). Sixth, acknowledgement that a different discourse or episteme will arise at a
different historical moment opening up a new ‘discursive formation’ 47. These elements
provide us with a complex conception of knowledge as inextricably enmeshed in
dominant power relations because knowledge is a technique in the regulation of social
conduct and the imaginary that informs it. Foucault foregrounded the relation between
discourse, knowledge and power as a fundamental nexus to understand processes of
representation. His approach rescued representation from the clutches of a purely formal
theory and gave it a historical, practical and worldly context of operation, as Hall
depicts 48.
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2. 3. Public Culture and the Choice of Ethnography

Introduction
“Hypertextuality of popular culture implicates what is
conventionally known as high culture, as well as the officially
(and academically) despised categories of non- metropolitan
low culture. This does not, however, mean that the mad
hypertextuality of popular culture is without structure” 49.
It seems to me that one of the basic difficulties is trying to situate public culture
(as a category of analysis) in the contemporary Egyptian context, given the polarized
theoretical paradigm that dichotomizes high and low culture. Seymour analyzes how such
a distinction impeded the growth of mass media productions as subject of studies in
anthropology:
“Another reason for the lack of attention that the mass media has received in
anthropology is the broader bias in academia against those aspects of culture
considered lowbrow. Within this broader cultural debate, art, literature and
entertainment are often divided into high and low forms, with most televisual
programming falling under the latter category. Folklore, most art, some music,
most theatre and some film are regarded as a part of high culture, and therefore
worthy of our attention and academic interest. There is a long tradition of
devaluing certain forms of art and entertainment in the Western culture.” 50
Seymour claims that this tradition started to fade out when Debra Spitulnik published her
book Anthropology and mass media in 1993. However, the limited view of public culture
in Africa as a ‘premodern’ creation that conveys a primitive and isolated particularity of
the African societies still affects cultural studies of mass media. Armbrust 51 citing Talal
Asad 52 points out that anthropology has been more concerned with studying ‘non
modern’ peoples, and so has historically rejected, as an object of study, those aspects of
societies and cultures which are considered modern. This focus on the premodern in
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anthropology has meant that orality is the main focus of analysis, while the written and
the mediated have been neglected. This explains why anthropologists in a place such as
Cairo have managed to do research on people’s everyday lives without mentioning the
fact that these lives are highly mediated.
In this thesis, I rely on an understanding of public culture as a socio- cultural
construct that invokes a constellation of meanings and connotations derived from the
collective social imaginary and the individual everyday interactions in particular
sociopolitical context. This makes of public culture in Egypt an equivalent of ‘culture’ as
a unitary construct if we traced an allegorical relation to Johannes Fabian’s view of
popular culture in Africa:
“Popular culture is not an entity; the term stands for certain discursive strategies.
Popular culture signals a discourse that raises issues of power, if only because it
tends to contest what is being affirmed about culture. Although the approach
sketched here denies ontological status to culture, this does not mean that culture
and popular culture are merely analytical categories or heuristic devices. They are
real enough as practices of inquiry and writing, addressed to real practices of
living and embroiled in political relations and interests” 53.
In his statement, Fabian challenges the pejorative approach that situates popular
culture between locality and non-modernity on the one hand, and its victimization as
being an indigent Westernized copy. He claims that popular culture is far more
integrative and meaningful for the diverse functions and implications it holds. In his
integrative approach to study popular culture in Africa, Fabian equated popular culture
productions like painting, theatre, music to religion as discourses that make up a vast
complex of thought, representations and performances. Fabian asks anthropologists to
review the centrality of popular culture in the social reality of Africa and consequently
reassess its categorical position in their theoretical frameworks. He thinks that reaching
such a conviction will reposition the ethnographer towards his/ her subjects and free him/
her from the confining prejudices: “… To further our understanding of contemporary
African culture by progressing from fixations on tribal traditions perishing under the
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onslaught of Westernization to appreciating the vital, often exuberant expressions modern
Africans give to their experiences” 54.
Informed by this understanding of popular culture, my research focuses on the
media representations and metaphors in both films (Heen Maysara and El Lemby), as
well as the social structures and power relations which shape the characters. The nexus of
these two foci affords my analysis a rich subtext about social reality which I read against
the background of larger context of Egypt. Unpacking the political and social
connotations of a mainstream cultural production, as reflected in the two movies, offers
me an angle to view the production and workings of a collective social imaginary and
consciousness. Such an approach enables me to trace power relations and social
hierarchy, venues of resistance, and the limitations of individual agency as constructed in
the movies and the interpretations thereof.
Mass media in contemporary Africa cannot be assessed and analyzed solely
according to aesthetic or entertainment parameters. It is their power of expression and
giving voice to the silenced subjects that distinguishes their position as an artistic work:
“Not mere exposure to power and oppression, but transformation of experience into
communicable expressions, is at the origin of popular culture as resistance to colonial and
postcolonial domination” 55. Building on this perspective, ethnographic fieldwork
establishes the relation between the public culture experience and the historical moment
of its occurrence. The notion of historicity, as deployed in my research, combines both
the contextual particularity of the cultural practice in Egypt and the massive influence of
Westernized modernization processes (particularly neoliberal programs) that influence
social reality in the period 2002-2008.
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2. 3. 1. Ethnography and Encompassing the Everyday

“To approach anything remotely like a ‘native’ ability to understand how
Egyptians deploy their common stock of imagery and personalities
requires a familiarity with popular texts that is more like what Orientalists
do with medieval texts- relating them to each other, comparing them to
each other, comparing them with other textual traditions, juxtaposing
them, classifying them- than like the anthropologist’s fantasy of spending
a year with ‘informants’, ‘picking up the language in the field’, and
relying on ‘theory’ to do the rest” 56.
The call for an ethnographic study of media productions emerged from the need
to broaden the analyses of mass media phenomena from the encoding- decoding model of
Stuart Hall 57. Anthropologists deployed ethnography in research as a methodological
strategy to witness and analyze reception as a practice that constitutes part of a total
cultural framework. The gap that ethnography is able to bridge between a macrocosmic
conception of culture and its microcosmic enactment in everyday lives is located in the
reception processes. Ethnographic research about public culture implicates reception in
intricate ways. As Lila Abu- Lughod argues:
“An enquiry into the audience should be an enquiry, not into a set of preconstituted individuals or rigidly defined social groups, but into a set of daily
practices and discourses within which the complex act of watching television is
placed alongside others, and through which that complex act is itself
constituted” 58.
Assessing reception is part of the methodological endeavor to interpret the social
and political implications of a mass media production. To de- mystify the meanings and
codes of a dramatic text can not happen according to the researcher’s own projections. It
is the process of exploring individual dimensions of interpretation that allows
possibilities to engage with the text from different perspectives. Ethnography in this

56

. Armbrust, Walter. 1996. “Introduction” In Mass Culture and Modernism in Egypt. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. P. 6.
57
. Seymour, Elizabeth M. (1999). Imagining Modernity: Consuming Identities and Constructing the Ideal
Nation on Egyptian Television. PhD. Dissertation. Binghamton University. P.14.
58
. Abu- Lughod, L. 2005. “Part One: Anthropology and National Media” In Dramas of Nationhood: The
Politics of Television in Egypt. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. P. 31.

31

sense gives the researcher the chance to embrace the discursiveness, contingency and
unpredictability of the cultural phenomena. Seymour cites Valentin Volosinov 59:
“His work focuses on the sociohistorical dimensions of textual production and
reception, arguing that the cultural competencies necessary for the interpretation
of particular narratives are differentially distributed. Therefore, he argues that not
everyone is situated identically in society, that their personal histories, social
positions, as well as other aspects of their complex lives affect the ways in which
they interpret, play with, consume, and/or are influenced by a given text” 60
In my thesis, I argue that ethnographic fieldwork, practiced with reflexivity, helps
me re-examine my theoretical stance and my prejudiced assumptions about the social
reality in Egypt by reaching out to the wide variety of receptive audience. This reexamination would be based on the ability to establish a set of relations that transcend the
conventional research strategy to a more complex reading of the contexts and media of
reception. Spitulnik elaborates on the questions that ethnography of mass media
productions raises:
“However, by utilizing these methods and asking these questions, these
researchers have moved to a ‘post- content’, ‘post- text’ era, raising serious
questions about the production- consumption dichotomy itself. They question the
utility of theorizing mass media’s relations to reality and the construction of social
meaning, adding further complexity to the simple picture of media- messagetransmission as a one way communication process” 61
Ethnographic fieldwork would provide new insights to my previous awareness of
the dominant discourses in the Egyptian society. By deciphering the mechanisms of
reception and the correspondent discourses and meanings that stem from this interaction
with the films Heen Maysara and El Lemby, the quality of change that shapes
contemporary Egyptian public scenery is more tangible. Ethnography as a research tool
allows me access to viewers, taking into consideration their class position, gender
sensitivities and individual particularity.
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2. 3. 2. Ethnography: Culture as Praxis
“Every society appears to bring to these ‘popular’
forms its own special history and traditions, its own
cultural stamp, its own quirks and idiosyncrasies” 62.
I tried to elaborate on my understandings about an ethnographic study of public
culture in the Egyptian context. I highlighted the theoretical backgrounds and the
fundamental assumptions that render ethnography the method of choice for my research.
Below I detail the process of ethnographic research starting from collecting data and
ending with writing my thesis. My ethnographic research was primarily based on two
central notions that shaped ethnographic encounters.
The first one is related to time. Ethnographic study of contemporary media
productions must be aware of its integration in the everyday as a contemporary
expression and interaction. Such an awareness of the particularity of time of the
community targeted by the study has two prospects. One is history and the second is the
contemporary context of occurrence. Anthropological studies of public culture are, as
Fabian states, part of the blurring of boundaries between ethnology/anthropology and
history. An ethnographer must develop strategies to observe innovations and
irregularities in and of the contemporary situation and follow spatial and temporal
connections to continuously improve and refine his/ her participant observation and
knowledge.
In this thesis, I paid specific attention to the historical moment of production of
Heen Maysara and El Lemby. I contend that the sociopolitical conditions during 20022008 greatly influenced the imagery of the lower classes in Egypt and the dominant
discourses adopted by the Egyptian middle class as well. Describing the critical position
and the precariousness of the moment of release of the movies became fundamental to
my research. Navigating through the published newspaper articles and the TV programs
that talked about the threat of Ashwaiyyat and the aggressive attacks on the film makers
were part of my analysis. Also, depicting the extremist portrayals of the poor in both
films and highlighting the facility in narrating their suffering were part of tracing the link
to the haphazardness of the historical moment of production and consumption. Moreover,
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I could not separate the contemporary moment and its precariousness from a continuous
historical context that antedated 2002. I provided an analysis of preceding historical
periods that structured the social imaginary of the middle class in Egypt and that
propelled the emergence of the phenomena of Ashwaiyyat. From this position, I consider
that in my ethnography of both films boundaries between description of representations
and analysis of reality were eventually blurred.
The second parameter of ethnographic research is concerned with language and
the writing of ethnography. Language in an ethnographic study is cornerstone that
influences the study at two principal levels. The first level is the translated and
interpreted local language that forms the body of the collected data and informants’
commentaries and conversations. The second level is the language of writing
ethnographic knowledge and communicating information, analysis and meaning.
Language is therefore an instrument of power attributed to the ethnographer.
Through the process of transcribing and translating his/her observations, the
researcher is re-articulating the contemporary context and situating everyday practices
within his/ her framework of analysis. The inevitability of linguistic misinterpretation
challenges the notion of objectivity in a hermeneutic study:
“Translating texts, often even merely transcribing them from recordings, can be a
daunting task. Similarly, to perceive and interpret the richness of popular
expression requires historically situated, shared knowledge that an ethnographer
can never fully acquire. The study of ‘humble’ popular culture teaches us
humility.” 63
In short, achieving a ‘thick description’ of the media representation is an
extremely challenging experience. Lila Abu- Lughod proposes that as ethnographers
informed

by

microscopic

descriptions,

we

should

profit

from

the

careful

contextualization of the small and the large facts and events, thereby allowing us to frame
multiple texts and sites within a specific place 64. Lila Abu- Lughod identifies two
modalities of ethnographic research: mobile and multi-sited ethnography. She elaborates:
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“Mobile ethnography moves out from the single sites and local situations of
conventional research designs to examine the circulation of cultural meanings,
objects, and identities in diffuse time- space. Second is multi- sited ethnography
that depends on doing ethnographies of life- worlds in several locations- not
haphazardly but with the intention of revealing the connections among them as
the logic of larger systems within which particular lives unfold. The nation, it
could be argued, is such a system.” 65
Abu- Lughod is expanding the space of ethnographic research by deploying the
technique of thick description of the microcosmic practices to larger systems of meaning
and operation. In my research about contemporary media productions in Egypt, I examine
the performance of the state as a large system of power through the representation of its
minor practices in everyday life. Media representations of ashwaiyyat and their dwellers
convey the network of power relations that nurture and govern social interaction under
the sovereignty of the Egyptian state. Ethnography of mass media in Egypt provides a
methodological ability to interpret these representative instances according to broader
circuits of power between the state and its subjects. Mobile ethnography and multi-sited
ethnography as described by Abu- Lughod provide me as an ethnographer with an
additional freedom while classifying, contextualizing and decoding knowledge gained
through fieldwork.
2.3.3. Methods and Techniques of Research

To integrate the previous theoretical trajectories in a comprehensible ethnography
about the contemporary Egyptian media productions, my work is informed by the
ethnographies of Walter Armbrust 66 and Lila Abu- Lughod 67 of the contemporary artistic
productions in Egypt, in addition to the film ethnography “Lawrence of Arabia” of Steve
Caton 68. I pursued a thick description of the films and completed structured and semistructured interviews with different agents under analytical categories of producers and
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consumers of media. I supplemented these two methods with actual and contingent
knowledge about the Egyptian sociopolitical context via multiple interlocuters, secondary
literature, reports of organizations and newspapers. This approach is an attempt to
redefine fieldwork in media studies and address the complexity of media reception,
according to Patrick D. Murphy and Marwan M. Kraidy:
“Unlike the less closed- contexts and more performative- ritualized spaces that
have been the customary sites for ethnographic inquiry throughout anthropology’s
history, media technologies are creating increasingly intimate, microcosmic and
virtual reception environments and practices. This makes of the notion of
participant observation of media audiences extremely arduous in many cases, and
suggests a rethinking of what constitutes “doing fieldwork”. Here we suggest that
media ethnography be understood as a research process of forming communities
and making conversations that underscore systematic and long- term investment
in form, purpose and practice” 69.
In this thesis, I conducted fifteen to twenty interviews with viewers from Egyptian
middle and poor classes. This sporadic sample is intended to reflect a multiplicity of
positions of reception that I would classify as follows:

1- Producers (cinema makers): These included scriptwriters Belal Fadl and Nasser
Abd Al Rahman who wrote lot of films about ashwaiyyat in 2002- 2008, and two
young film makers working at the national institute of cinema and the director
Khairy Bishara as a key figure in the production of films about poor classes
before 2002.
2- Audience: I interviewed three middle class national university students and an
American university student. Moreover, I interviewed two female domestic
workers who dwell in Al Marg (considered Ashwaiyy quarter). Both women
offered such different visions and interpretations of the films and further
elaborated on the everyday life and practices in ashwaiyyat especially on the level
of interaction with state officers and administrators. I also interviewed prominent
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critics that reviewed the films about ashwaiyyat like Tarek Al Shenawi and
Safinaz Kazem.
3- Ethnography of film: I present a content analysis of the two films Heen Maysara
and El Lemby to elaborate first on their relations to the sociopolitical context and
to explicate the connotations and discourses within their scenes. I draw on and
analyze a large number of newspapers articles, TV programs and international
organizations reports to shed light on internal and external views and analyses of
the current situation in Egypt on social and political levels. I pay particular
attention to the treatment of the notion of chaos in these texts and how they
correspond to incidents and events reported in newspapers and documented by
interlocutors.

In my interviews with viewers and critics, I focused on various themes like how they
received both movies and how they would connect (or not) the implied narratives to their
everyday lives. I was interested in gathering their spontaneous reaction towards the
characters as well as their intellectual contemplation about the position of poor and
deprived subjects. Part of my questions were concentrating on mapping out the
positionality of my subjects as middle class members and assessing the extent to which
such position influenced their reception and tolerance of the characters and the storyline.
I was concerned with following how my interlocutors established links between the social
reality they live and survive, the state performance towards them as subjects and the
media representations of the middle and lower classes in Heen Maysara and El Lemby. I
also found it relevant, while interviewing critics and film producers, to collect technical
data that would support my argument.
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Chapter Three

The Egyptian Postcolonial State (1952- 2008): Producing the social imaginary of the
subordinate subjects

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter I present an overview of the nature of power of the Egyptian
postcolonial state since independence from the Ottoman Empire rule, signified by the
military coup of 1952 and the withdrawal of the British colonizing forces in 1954. My
focus primarily is on the mechanisms and the influences that configured the state/ citizens
relationship during the rule of Gamal Abd El Nasser and Anwar Al Sadat, then following
the structuring of this relationship under Mubarak (1980- present). Specifically, I
emphasize how the projects and discourses adopted by the postcolonial state under each
presidency affected the fields of artistic production particularly in the film industry. I
argue that the postcolonial state in Egypt inherited the legacy of the colonial power thus
reproducing colonizer/ colonized relationship as a model befitting its national subjects.
The maintenance of such status of subordination of subjects has been a key priority of the
political regime in Egypt since 1952, and continues until the present.

Given this history of the independent postcolonial state in Egypt, I broaden my
analytical framework to theoretical approaches beyond those usually adopted within
Middle East Studies. I argue that in addition to such framework, analyses of the
postcolonial states in Africa offer a rich analytical perspective from which to examine the
case of Egypt. I contend that the precariousness and uncertainty of the sociopolitical
conditions in Egypt (2002- 2008) are quiet significant features in reading the
contemporary media representations and the way they are consumed. In what follows I
elaborate on the limitations of analysis of state in the Middle East. To address these
limitations, I rely on Achille Mbembe’s analysis of the postcolonial states in Africa
which guides my ethnographic interpretations of the films Heen Maysara and El Lemby.
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Then, I trace how the constitution and the social imaginary of the Egyptian middle class
was shaped after independence, exploring the different strategies and techniques
deployed in its relations to the state and the larger sociopolitical context. In this respect, I
argue that scrutinizing the history of the postcolonial state in Egypt from the perspective
of middle class reconfiguration and transformation is indispensable to understanding how
middle class members consume contemporary media productions. In the last section of
this chapter, I provide a historical background about the emergence of ashwaiyyat in
Egypt and I elaborate on my theoretical position concerning the perception of their
dwellers in the official media.
My concern in this chapter is thus to contextualize the two films Heen Maysara
(2007) and El Lemby (2002), as contemporary media productions, within the historical
and the present sociopolitical conditions of their production and consumption. This
contextualization is necessary for my argument concerning the linkages between media
representations and contemporary social realities in Egypt Mubarak’s regime.

3.2. Middle Eastern ‘Exceptionalism’ versus Postcolonial ‘Precariousness’

In this section, I propose to examine the Egyptian postcolonial state by situating it
at the nexus of Middle East and sub- Saharan theorists of postcoloniality. I contend that
narrowing my analysis to the geopolitical confines of Middle East engagements would
produce yet another account of a modern state that gained independence after withdrawal
of the colonizing British and Ottoman forces in 1954. Such an account fails short of
illuminating the intricacies of the contemporary historical moment in Egypt, specifically
the nature of power of the national political regime and its relations to colonial power on
one hand and to its national subjects on the other.
I argue that Middle Eastern studies usually posit non-Western states in the
Middle East as ones that adopted modern institutions of rule and hence are capable of
functioning according to modern systems of governance. To account for the prevailing
and varied forms of authoritarianism such studies resort to the analytical categories of
‘cultural relativism’ and ‘Middle East exceptionalism’. Theorists of Middle Eastern
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studies like Ellis Goldberg 70, Eberhard Kienle 71 and Roger Owen 72 view Islamic religion
and culture as part of the Middle Eastern states’ particularity and point out that they are
partly responsible for the development of authoritarian rule in the Middle East. Owen
stresses that an inherent cultural model is behind the incongruence between Middle
Eastern states and the Western-type modern state:
“Matters become still more complex when we turn to non –European world in
general, and to the Middle East in particular. By and large most of the political
writing concerned with defining the state, together with an associated vocabulary
involving such key terms as ‘legitimacy, ‘hegemony’ and ‘authority’, took place
not only in Europe but also on the basis of an evaluation of a purely European
experience. Some of this thinking was then transposed to a discussion of the state
outside Europe without any great concern to whether it made sense in what was
obviously a different historical and cultural environment. It follows that it also
must be amenable to much the same analyses of their strengths and weaknesses as
their European neighbors. And as always this helps to create a counter-position:
The view that Western- type states are inappropriate for the Middle East, that they
lack roots and cultural meaning, and therefore are bound to perform badly and,
indeed, to make the difficulties of the government a great deal worse.” 73
And despite that Owen admits a Eurocentric academic discourse that creates a
‘counter-position’ concerning the Middle Eastern sates’ classification, he could not
distinguish between the distorted inheritance of a European state model and the
inheritance of a Western colonial legacy that was transposed and replicated in the
state/subjects relationship after independence. It seems as if those theorists are
incarnating two historically separate theoretical paradigms and approaches to state
building processes in the Middle East: one is of the model of Western modern state which
is not applicable to Middle East (for lacking ‘cultural meaning’), and the other is a
temporal and theoretical disconnected that undermines the effects of the lengthy eras of
colonization on the contemporary modes of governance in the Middle East.
This tendency is best exemplified in Joel Migdal’s definition of non-European
state model where he borrows the exact terminology and connotations of a European state
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while excluding the signs of colonial influence, particularly the inheritance of a
colonizer/ colonized relationship premised on the deployment of violence by the ruler on
the ruled. Migdal identifies a non-European state as: “an organization, composed of
numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state’s leadership (executive authority)
that has the ability to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as
the parameters of rule making for other social organizations in a given territory, using
force of necessary to have its way” 74 Following this definition, Owen delineated the
reasons behind the emergence of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. He argues that
borrowing an artificial modern state model from the colonial power (i.e. a centralized
administration, a legal system, a flag, and internationally recognized boundaries)
produced an exaggerated need for policing and achieving control over the boundaries and
the subjects on the part of the state 75.
In contrast, Achille Mbembe theorized the complex structure of the postcolonial
state in Africa within a framework that escaped the dichotomy between the local culture
and the colonial power legacies. In his analysis of the postcolonial state in Cameroon,
Mbembe described the process of the making of the ruling regimes in the postcolony. He
postulated:
“And since, in Africa both before and after colonization, state power enhanced its
value by establishing specific relations of subjection, something must be said
about the relationships between subjection, the distribution of wealth and tribute,
and the more general problem of the constitution of the postcolonial subject. The
second factor is that postcolonial African regimes have not invented what they
know of government from scratch. Their knowledge is the product of several
cultures, heritages, and traditions of which the features have become entangled
over time, to the point where something has emerged that has the look of ‘custom’
without being reducible to it, and partakes of ‘modernity’ without being wholly
included in it. One part of this knowledge or rationality is colonial rationality.” 76
In my ethnography of the films Heen Maysara and El Lemby, I trace and unpack
such relations of subjection as an essential feature of the performance of the Egyptian
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state in the postcolonial era. I deploy the two axioms identified by Mbembe namely
wealth and tribute distribution and the creation of the postcolonial subject, in interpreting
first the gaze of a privileged middle class towards the dwellers of ashwaiyyat, second the
police coercion and violence towards the national subjects. Such an approach allows me
to critically examine multiple phenomena described in the Middle East, especially the
emphasis on policing and control, the expansion of state apparatus and bureaucracy and
the authoritarian modes of governance without reducing it to a dichotomy of cultural and
historical disjuncture. Further, understanding the coloniality of power from Mbembe’s
perspective substantiates my argument concerning the relation between the longevity of
the ruling regime in Egypt and the perpetuation of the rule of exception and
unconditionality.
Mbembe outlines the following criteria of the ruling regimes in postcolonial
Africa: Being based on a regime of exception that departed from the ‘common law’,
lacking autonomous institutions, instating a system of privileges and immunities that
enhanced the civil society stratification to inscribe the reality of inequality, providing no
limits for state authority especially on the juridical system and deploying violence as the
essence of the sovereignty of the state. The next section, I will use these criteria to
highlight how the middle class imaginary was shaped by the postcolonial state in Egypt
(1952- 2008). I will also trace how the behavior of the Egyptian state in different
historical periods affected the position and constitution of this class and consequently its
relation to the lower classes, and shaped the nature of social discourses produced by the
middle class and are partly exemplified in media representations

3.3. The Social Imaginary of the Egyptian Middle Class (1952- 2008): A History of
Ascension and Decline

It can be argued that the foundation of the first independent Egyptian state in
modern history was officially declared in 1954 following the military coup led by Gamal
Abdel Nasser 77 in 1952. However, the declaration of the independent postcolonial state
77
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was preceded by a struggle for independence from British colonization of Egypt that
persisted from 1882 until 1951. This prolonged struggle capitalized on including the
educated sectors of the Egyptian populace under the umbrella of a nationalistic discourse
that strives for independence as the only pathway to reform and renaissance 78.
Conceiving an authentic Egyptian identity was one of the tasks that were carried out
actively by many political and social leaders in Egypt, especially after the 1919
revolution under the leadership of Saad Zaghloul of the Wafd Party 79. The liberal Wafd
party’s intellectuals at the time contributed immensely to portraying the aspired
independent nation as a potentially modern state with a remarkable influence of
enlightenment ideals on their discourse.
According to Galal Amin, this mobilization of the educated professionals and
bureaucrats in 1919 can be considered the primary stage in the conception of a well
defined Egyptian middle class 80. Amin postulates that the Egyptian middle class achieved
relative independence by 1922, thus drafting the first Egyptian constitution in 1923, and
establishing the first Egyptian bank. Moreover, Amin asserts that this class was active
and productive in both industrial and cultural fields. The Egyptian middle class founded
Cairo University in 1908 and produced magnificent works of art, music and theatre and
led a respectful struggle to reform the religious discourse and rejuvenate the literature and
artistic domains 81. When the Nasser regime came to power in 1954, it profited from the
privileged middle class’s achievements and deployed its hegemony on both the political
and cultural realms in Egypt. The state then relied on the prevalent cultural and social
discourse that consolidated the aspirations for a modern state on a “classical Western
model” much as on an “independent” one with clear local and national identity
fundamentals.

consolidated the rule of dictatorship and adopted strict security measures against free expression and
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The independent postcolonial state thus capitalized on this hybrid discourse to
initiate its mode of rule 82. However, the transition to postcoloniality followed a pathway
that influenced the state/subjects relationship in many ways. Mbembe argues that a role
exchange happens between the rulers of the postcolonial state and their precedent
colonizers. This exchange implies two notions of commandment that prevail in a colony
and are then transferred to the postcolony. The first is ‘founding violence’ which
becomes the main determinant of the relation between colonizer/native (now
state/citizen). This violence is meant to underpin the ‘right of conquest’, in Mbembe’s
words, of the state as a sole power of judging and legitimating social practices. The
second notion is using the power (“founding violence”) to structure activities and
strategies of all social agents and shaping the public domain to tighten its control over its
subjects. Mbembe contends that the state has to “help produce an imaginary capacity
converting the founding violence into authorizing authority” 83. The merger between the
state role as an absolute authoritarian power on one hand, and the state as the beholder of
the independent nation’s renaissance project befits Nasser’s period in Egypt (19541970). The welfare project adopted by the state enormously affected the structuring
process of the Egyptian middle class and consequently its imaginary and media
productions.

3.3.1. The Welfare Project: Granting Privilege to Guarantee Subordination

The Nasser regime announced a project of reform and renaissance that gathered
the aspirations of the independent nation and centralized the role of the state in the
political structure as the sole agent to carry it out. Salwa Ismail defines this mission as the
“project of the welfare state”:
“Since the 1952 revolution, the Egyptian state has defined itself as a welfare
state concerned with its citizens’ social reproduction. Welfare provisions were
fundamental to the ideological justifications of the ruling regime in postrevolutionary Egypt. Further, they have entered into the terms organizing
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state- society relations as embodied in the notion of the social contract. The
policies and the laws that marked the outlines of this contract conveyed a
populist bent reinforced by rhetoric on popular alliances and the elimination
of class antagonism.” 84
The quest for modernization and progress served usually as the imaginary space
through which the state emphasized its social domination and interference in all aspects
of the public life 85. The police state during the Nasser era was masked by the ability of
the state to provide the basic social and economic needs (free education, health insurance
and work) and imbuing it with nationalistic socialist mottos (Ibid, 52). Nikloas Rose and
Peter Miller affirm this relation: “The logic of the welfare programs involves the
delineation of a sphere of government intervention separate from the political but
networked with it and having as its broader purpose the governing of the population” 86.
During this time Egypt witnessed a huge expansion of the bureaucracy, the police
and the army as well as the number of public enterprises. Owen claims that the need to
maintain security after the departure of the colonial power, the drive to establish control
over the whole of the new national territory and the desire to use the state to promote
large programs of economic development and social welfare, were behind such an
expansion 87. However, he also argues that the state guaranteed immunities and enormous
power to individuals at the apex of the regime which ended in the creation of an
authoritarian system where power is highly centralized and the state assumes monopoly
on every kind of political activity. Simultaneously, the regime was taking radical steps to
achieve land reform (1952), constructing the high dam of Aswan and inaugurating the
Helwan steel and iron complex in 1954. The nationalization of Suez canal in 1956
stimulated further state-led developments culminating in the first five-year plan (1960-
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1965) and the nationalization of the Egyptian private banks and other factories and
enterprises in 1960-1961 88.
The state, under the rule of Nasser, increasingly acquired a wide base of
supporters and accomplished its hegemony on the political and public domains through a
series of service institutions (expansion of free education, providing employment in the
public sector, subsidization of foodstuffs) and a ‘clientalistic’ political machinery that
constituted the essence of its rule 89. This base was founded essentially on expanding the
Egyptian middle class by embracing members from the lower classes who benefitted
from free education and joined public professions as well as members from the Egyptian
rural areas after the land reform and the consequential growth of the agricultural sector
and land ownership 90. The obvious growth of the state apparatus due to the increase of
general employment can be demonstrated by the rise of the number of Egyptian
employed in bureaucracy and public enterprises from 350,000 in 1951/2 to over
1,000,000 in 1965/6 and the doubling of the number of state ministries from 15 to 29
during the same period 91.
The artistic scenery in Egypt was greatly influenced by these transformations. The
major institutions of art and media production were confiscated by the state and were
deployed to propagate the slogans of the ruling elite and create a concensus on the
fundamentals of the 1952 revolution. Inflamed lyrics of patriotic songs, imbued with
nationalist sentiments and full support of the Egyptian political regime (usually reduced
to become the persona of the Egyptian president) played important part in producing the
nationalist image of the postcolonial Egyptian state during the time between 1952 and
1973. Abd El Halim Hafez, the well-known Egyptian legendary crooner, was honorably
recognized for his contribution in mediating the nationalist socialist discourse of the
Nasser state to his audience 92. Halim's songs described in great detail the strategic
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projects of Nasser, as well as his promises and ambitions for the renaissance of the
independent Egyptian Republic. Artists and their productions were perceived by the state
as national symbols who were assigned a patriotic mission to promote and reinforce a
collective national emotion that unified the entire Egyptian nation at that time 93. Through
artistic productions (songs, plays and movies), the social imaginary of a burgeoning
middle class started to identify with media productions fashioned according to the nationstate agenda, reflecting state’s ideology, glorifying its leader and disseminating his ideas
to the populace above all other considerations.
The singers of the patriotic songs (Halim and Um Kulthum, for example)
identified themselves as carriers of the nation's values and aspirations, additional soldiers
in the nation's struggle for independence and progress. The artists were alleged to be
proud being servants of the 'state' and ‘representatives of the nation' 94. Egyptian media
productions in this sense remained an expression of cooperation and acceptance of the
general political themes propagated by the state for the welfare of the nation and its
people. In this respect, it is important to clarify that venues of media productions such as
television, cinema production companies, theatres and radio stations, were nationalized
by the state and were run under meticulous supervision of the state bureaucracy.
Artistic productions were geared to attract the educated Egyptian middle class
impatient to attune itself to the combined authenticity and modernism discourse of
Nasser. To serve this purpose, the confiscated national cinema institutions produced
Egyptian films that carved the image of the expanding middle class in the social
imaginary. They focused on reproducing the dual state discourse on modernization and
authenticity, emphasizing and hailing the middle class as the beholder of the Egyptian
renaissance. The films featured the collapse of the feudal traditions and the extravagantly
rich people under the pressures of the burgeoning educated middle class armed with
knowledge and virtues of socialism and popular class alliances. Armbrust describes how
the Egyptian cinema pre-1970s depicted the ambitions of the middle class to achieve a
complex process of transition from the traditional to the modern society:
“The narratives of pre-1970 cinema were founded on the coupling of technique
with authenticity, whether of the classicist or local variety; or conversely, on
93
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calling attention to situations that contravened the joining of modernity with
tradition. The synthesized modernity with tradition, often in the character of the
educated bureaucrat or professional, was an important part of the narrative
structure of many films from the period, and was often implicit in films that did
not make such characters their central focus.” 95
It is significant in this respect to mention films like Rod Qalbi (Return my Heart)
1957, Ana Horra (I Am Free) 1959 and Al Aidy al Naema (The Soft Hands) 1963 that
portrayed the ascension of lower classes to join the middle class after pursuing education
and training (The hero becoming an army officer in Rod Qalbi or an editor in chief in
Ana Horra). The characters asserted the value of hard work, equality, respect for the poor
and social alliance (for instance the figure of the beloved poor father in Rod Qalbi and the
repellent rich yet unemployed man in Al Aidy al Naema).

3. 3. 2. The Withdrawal of the State and Anti-modernist Discourse

Egypt’s political and artistic fields of production were dramatically affected by
the 1967 military defeat of Egypt and the consequent Israeli occupation of Sinai. The
death of Nasser in 1970 and the strategic political and economic shifts of his successor
Anwar Al Sadat, especially his open-door economic policy and his visit to Jerusalem,
marked the symbolic, and in many ways the actual, announcement of failure of the
socialist Nasserite project 96.

These developments compelled the Egyptian educated

middle class to critically interrogate the nationalist short past. The depiction of
oppressiveness and censorship as the major criteria of the Nasser state propelled primary
claims for political and economic liberalism to emerge and gain recognition and
appreciation. The indisputable ability of the rising Egyptian nation to achieve economic
welfare, political independence and social justice were perceived with skepticism 97.
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The Egyptian and Arab peoples started to lose faith in the fundamental
assumptions of the Arab nationalist project. On the other hand, the technological
revolution that allowed the huge circulation of the video and cassette tapes in Egypt in
the seventies provided new spaces for the once marginalized artists to articulate their
artistic projects outside the domination of the state 98. Egyptian citizens for the first time
were allowed to break free from a monolithic hegemonic discourse constructed to
underpin the state project. The phenomenological success of the shaabi singer Ahmed
Adaweya after the release of his own cassettes in the 1970s threatened the superstars of
the official media, such as Halim, selling over one million copies of his first commercial
release (1977). Aided by an increasingly cynical populace and a burgeoning cassette
culture, Adaweya opened the gates for a chain of crooners to dump the Egyptian markets
with shaabi music and films starred by heroes from the poor classes 99. By this time, the
word shaabi would still be associated with vulgarity, backwardness and lower class
chants in contradistinction to the 'authenticity' discourse that used to characterize the
transformative discourse of modernist nationalism in the sixties.
The trend of representing the social alliance between a skillful and wise middle
class and the uneducated yet virtuous and honest poor classes started to decline in the
seventies. The sociopolitical context affected the media productions of the time.
Armbrust states:
“It would not be an exaggeration to describe the new popular culture style as
basically anti-modernist… Consequently, the most important change in the
‘mythic patterning’ of post-1970s Egyptian popular art is that the synthesizing
ideal evident in earlier films is absent. The sort of middle class modernist hero so
common in earlier films has, since the 1970s, been either beleaguered or
humiliated. These anti-modernist films are part of a widespread discourse on
popular art which encompasses media other than the cinema” 100.
The cinematic representation of the middle class and poor heroes became
equivalent to their deteriorating symbolic value in the prevalent social discourse. The
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cinematic representation was greatly affected by the change in their social positioning
and constraining economic situation. However, other authors like Galal Amin assume
that the middle class kept growing after the inauguration of the open door policies in
1974 through the inclusion of bigger numbers of members of the lower classes who
profited from the open door policies and the labor migration to the oil-rich gulf countries
and Libya 101. According to Amin, the opportunities for social mobility and ascension
through non-productive economic activities, like brokerage or foreign currency exchange,
introduced moral and ethical transformations of the growing middle class. An obsession
with consumption and wealth acquisition characterized the behavior of a wide sector of
the Egyptian people.
A significant portion of the cinematic production in late 1970s and 1980s102
focused on stories that depict the rapid ascent of a nouveaux riches businessmen class
who deployed illegal means of wealth accumulation during the presidency of Anwar Al
Sadat 103 (1970- 1981) as a direct consequence of the corrupt implementation of the open
door policies. These cinematic productions increasingly represented the predicament of
the middle class bureaucracy struggling with the economic imbalance between their
salaries and the constantly rising cost of living. They also detailed the social deterioration
of the middle class and mapped out the difficulties that professionals (especially doctors
and engineers) face after losing the privileges they acquired under the socialist regime of
Nasser.
In short, the political and economic conditions have been drastically altered in
Egypt disturbing the classical class structures configured under Nasser. After the
adoption of the open door policy in the seventies, the class hierarchy in Egypt took a
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different trajectory. The middle class (as defined in the sixties; educated professionals
and state’s employees) started to lose its privileged positions within state policies and
development projects. Under the rule of Al Sadat, there were marked deficiencies in
providing basic subsidized services like education and health, which kept on deteriorating
in a remarkable fashion over the following decades. The limitation of the social security
policies started to increase the gaps in the Egyptian social safety net and confirmed
state’s withdrawal from its welfare project. This withdrawal undermined the ability of the
Egyptian state to present itself as the provider for its citizens 104. The ideals of equality
and just distribution of wealth were challenged by the neoliberal principles that sought a
de-statization of the government 105. A state of mistrust started to emerge between the
Egyptians and their “fatherly” state with its ambitious modernist discourse.

3. 3. 3. Mubarak: The Rule of Impunity and the Perception of the Poor

In the previous section, I tried to highlight how the postcolonial state in Egypt
carved its image in the social imaginary as what Mbembe termed a “total cosmology for
its subjects”. This unremitting historical process was based on an assemblage of ideas,
discourses and images that put emphasis on the grotesque and obscene nature of the state
power into the collective consciousness thus inscribing the state as a fetish in the
everyday practices of its people 106. Mbembe contends that a relationship of “conviviality”
is the guarantee to preserve the subjection and submission of the postcolonial state
subjects. This conviviality unifies the rulers and the ruled in a ‘simulacrum’ or a system
of symbolic metaphors of mutual appreciation and apprehension that end up robbing both
parties of their vitality creating ultimately an indigent environment of zombies 107. This
description perfectly applies to the Egyptian state under Mubarak’s regime.
Under the rule of Mubarak (1981-present), the performance of the government
and the steps it took towards the adoption of neoliberal policies implicitly announced that
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the state has given up the welfare project 108. Mubarak’s regime promoted a rapid
liberalization and implemented different measures to introduce free market policies and
to privatize the public sector. The interference and influence of several transnational
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank under
the rubric of ‘structural adjustment’ was extensively expanding 109.
This shift can be viewed as part of the neoliberal paradigm that aims at relocating
programs of government from state institutions to non-state sites and actors 110. This
interference, sometimes viewed as a serious erosion of the sovereignty of the state 111,
represented and ushered a new “given” in the relations of the postcolonial state to its
international allies on the one hand and its local subjects on the other. The process of
autonomization of local entities (such as grass-root NGOs) under global governmentality
constituted a direct threat to the traditional system of governance that reigned in Egypt
since 1954:
“It indicates a new modality of government, which works by creating mechanisms
that work ‘all by themselves’ to bring about governmental results through the
devolution of risk onto the enterprise or the individual and the responsibilization
of subjects who are increasingly empowered to discipline themselves” 112.
The regime of Mubarak was compelled to allow relative freedom of expression
and to permit political spaces that were formerly seized by the state, like independent
newspapers and satellite channels 113. Hegemonic global discourses about minority rights,
human rights, personal freedoms and democracy increasingly invaded the social
discourse in Egypt. Different religious minorities in Egypt were encouraged by the
relative freedom of expression to protest religious persecution and to ask actively for
their equal citizenship rights and freedom of belief. Orthodox Copts and Bahais spoke out
either in the streets or in courtrooms demanding equal representation in society.
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Geographically marginalized social groups in Sinai, for example, engaged in bloody
violent confrontations with the state police objecting to their marginalized indigent
situation and their exclusion from state plans of development and reform (International
Crisis Group, 2007). The economically marginalized also benefited from the political
window of opportunity opened by the external discourse and pressure. In 2006 and 2007,
a series of strikes and sit-ins were carried out by many workers and employees in the
public sector who were demanding an increase in their wages and salaries 114.
This set of ‘spontaneous’ protest movements began among the educated middle
class as in the case of members of Kefaya (the Egyptian movement for change) in 2005 115
as well as state employees suffering from diminishing values of their salaries compared
to the rising costs of living. Eventually, workers and poor dwellers of ashwaiyyat invaded
the scene and started for the first time their organized sit-ins in request for clean water,
subsidized bread and dignified housing. It is becoming ordinary and routine subject of
daily news in Egypt (2007- 2008), to read and hear about hundreds or thousands of
Egyptians rioting in different governorates to fight for their basic needs like food and
housing. Amani Kandil reports:
“The protests of the poor were witnessed in some regions of Cairo and the
governorates (Portsaid and elsewhere) to demand housing. The real dimensions of
this problem were revealed with Kale’et Al Kabsh accidents in Al Sayeda Zeinab
quarter. The ‘poor’ had learned the act of demonstrating in front of the Council of
Ministers, the Parliament, the Governor’s headquarters. They now know the way
to the satellite channels and the independent newspapers… The third aspect of the
public protest movements is protesting to get loaf of bread from the bakeries of
Egypt. Hundreds and thousands demonstrate in the Egyptian governorates
(especially Southern Egypt) only to get the subsidized loaf of bread. In August
2007, people broke in a bakery in Southern Egypt to get their bread before it
being stolen by the bread ‘mafia’.” 116
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These sorts of protests that included for the first time ordinary non-politicized
people, not led or previously planned by intellectual entities or political parties, reflect
the degree of deterioration in the economic affairs in Egypt. It was obvious by then that
Egyptian workers and employees, minorities and political activists had given up on their
‘conviviality’ with the state, and revolted against the subjection relationship. The
deterioration of the economic situation, the suffocating political repression and the
complete withdrawal of the state from the implicit social contract justified the shift.
Moreover, the development and spread of consciousness of protest among the silent
masses was facilitated by the active media coverage and pressures of the international
and transnational agents mobilized the silenced strata. The media representation of the
marginalized sectors (including cinema) bore eventually its effects. They finally came to
perceive themselves as part of the social polity with rights which they pushed to insert
within the crowded state agenda.
This mobility introduced new sets of meanings and symbols that permeated the
social discourse and disentangled the ruled from the ‘simulacrum’. The disengagement of
the state from its social responsibility ignited a backlash among the neglected subjects.
However, these oppositions and protests stimulated an unprecedented aggression on the
part of the state. The political regime striving for the total encompassment of public
affairs and prioritizing security purposes above all considerations had to react brutally to
this threat. This violent reaction was intended to prolong the life of a deteriorating state
which had lost its principal advantage viz a viz its subjects by abondoning the welfare
project.
In this section, I paid exclusive attention to the mechanisms by which a sense of
absurdity and a state incoherence were inscribed in the social consciousness in
contemporary Egypt (2002-2008). These sensibilities, consequently, became almost an
indispensable and essential component that influenced the actions of people and infused
their daily comportment with impunity and violence, no matter what social class they
belonged to. The media representations of the contemporary social reality as exemplified
in Heen Maysara and El Lemby reflected this absurdity and incoherence. As I argue, the
middle class produced cinema however confined such phenomena to Ashwaiyyat and
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their residents in a desperate attempt to deny the expanse of chaos, violence, brutality and
precariousness in the society at large. As I will detail in the next chapters analyzing the
two movies, the predicament that encompassed a whole society struggling under the rule
of the postcolonial state was projected on the poor classes. Additionally, the figure of the
poor and ashwaiyyat dweller was constructed in such a manner as to render them the
source of threat par excellence.
3.4. Ashwaiyyat: The Phenomena and the Discourse

One of the major consequences of the shift from the “welfare state project” to the
“neoliberal state project”, as Ismail argues, was the decline in state provision of
subsidized housing and the rising costs for real estate in planned areas of the city. This
decline was behind the emergence of Cairo’s new popular quarters in the 1970s, as a
result of the restless communal efforts to provide cheap housing and acquire residential
spaces. Informal housing communities increased gradually during the last forty years 117.
Asef Bayat argues that the emergence of ashwaiyyat was a reaction to the stabilization
and diffusion of urbanization outside of the cities and urban centers, primarily for
economic reasons:
“The unaffordable prices of newly built formal housing exclude the low- income
groups from the housing market. Thus, there remains no other option for young
people, in particular those who intend to start a family, but to seek housing in the
informal market. Hence, they venture out to join the “outsiders” who inhabit the
large ashwaiyyat, the informal agglomerations surrounding metropolitan areas.
Many of the inhabitants of these communities still depend on job opportunities
within metropolitan areas, to which they commute daily. However, their
residential communities are more than simply functional “dormitories” 118.
Bayat’s argument presents urban expansion in ashwaiyyat as a reflection of the
serious economic condition that renders informal urban spaces not only dwellings for the
lower marginalized classes but also for the struggling lower middle class that may
possess a fair educational level and a public profession. This fact challenges the classical
conception in the dominant discourse about ashwaiyyat as spaces that breed lawlessness,
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extremism, crime and poverty and re-situate them as integral part of the national
economy and population. However, it sheds light on the nature of an internal dialogue
swirling inside the Egyptian society about the transformations that occurred to the class
hierarchy and the threats of decline and collapse preoccupying the minds of the Egyptian
middle class.

3. 4. 1. Ashwaiyyat in social imaginary and discourse
Within a short span of time, the ashwaiyy quarters increased, acquiring new forms
that reflected their informal infiltration of agricultural land, the unplanned construction
and the illegal acquisition of the basic services like water, sewage and electricity 119. One
of the consequences of the neglect by the state is that the dwellers of these quarters
acquired relative autonomy in establishing their houses on agricultural lands and
providing living services like water and electricity illegally. These informal communities
however escaped the regulatory power of the state and urban planning departments of the
government. Discipline and organization of daily life became internal responsibilities
carried out by the dwellers themselves ignoring the legal procedures and the role of state
professionals. The continuous exclusion of ashwaiyyat from urban participation,
primarily on the part of the state, encouraged the development of a social discourse that
defined ashwaiyyat as ‘non-modern’ and ‘abnormal’ spaces and synthesized their
dwellers as ‘outsiders’:
“Thus, those neighborhoods where buildings have no permits, where streets have
no formal name, where men wear the traditional galabiyya, where women sit and
socialize in front of their homes in the alleyways and where adults are largely
active in the informal economy are considered as ‘non- modern’ and thus
‘abnormal’. Moreover, these settlements are not even thought of as part of the
modern city since their inhabitants, mainly migrants, are seen to have, in effect,
‘ruralized’ their settlements” 120.
In the 1980s and 1990s, and due to the concentration of the terrorist Islamist
groups in ashwaiyyat (particularly in Imbaba), the public discourse about ashwaiyyat
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turned from indifference to hostility121. Stressing the chaotic nature of these quarters and
the vulgar and disorganized mannerisms of their inhabitants, the Egyptian media
portrayed ashwaiyyat as an incubatory medium for terrorists, criminals and fanatics.
Ismail describes how the confrontation between the Islamists and the Egyptian
government influenced the public discourse about ashwaiyyat:
“Hence, state authorities started to see these communities not only as an urban
management challenge but also as a security threat. In dealing with the Islamists
and with the informal housing communities, the state-in particular its security
apparatus and urban planning directorates - constructed the challenge in terms of
an urban pathology. The communities and their residents were represented as
problematic, marginal; disintegrate elements of the urban setting” 122.
The official state media supported this hostile tone and played a positive role in
coupling ashwaiyyat with terrorism and vulgarity in the consciousness of middle class
recipients. The television series “Al Aela” (the family) 1994 and the film “Al Erhaby”
(the terrorist) 1995 presented two similar characters of terrorists that grew up in
ashwaiyyat and committed horrible crimes against innocent middle class people.
However, after 2002, this discourse began to face problems due to the overlapping
discourse in the independent media about injustice and inhumane lives of people in these
quarters. Moreover, the Egyptian cinema integrated ashwaiyyat in its matrix and
represented the issues and concerns of their dwellers in its recent productions.
In the last decade, ashwaiyy quarters (as they are usually labeled in the Egyptian
media) reached one thousand and two hundred regions according to the latest statistics of
the housing ministry. Fifteen millions of the Egyptian population (77 millions in 2008)
are claimed to dwell in these communities 123. The growth and increase of ashwaiyy
quarters stands as a counter-phenomena to the rising numbers of the recently emerging
private compounds with lavish properties and luxurious equipments that express an urban
polarization and social cleavage taking place in Egyptian society at present. The upper
classes are intentionally distancing their private life from the sight and severity of poverty
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and from the anticipated violence of the marginalized and impoverished groups dwelling
in ashwaiyyat.
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Chapter Four
Heen Maysara and El Lemby: The hidden fears of a threatened class
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter I outline the ideas and social debates surrounding the
production and the big success of Heen Maysara and El Lemby in the Egyptian box
office. I aspire to present different views that convey a general image of how the middle
class imagines and constitutes its relation to the poor and how such imaginary reflects the
precarious positionality I detailed in chapter 3. I rely on comments of regular viewers,
critics and film makers and on the published literature about the films and the current
situation of the Egyptian middle class.
4.2. “Heen Maysara”: The Debate and the Predicament
“From the very beginning of Heen Maysara (Whenever it is possible), I knew that
no sympathetic relationship could be established between me and this film”, Ahmed
Awny, a mechanical engineering young student argues in a personal interview. Awny (21
years old) was speaking about the avant-titre of the film in the form of a photomontage of
several Egyptian newspapers’ headlines announcing the danger of the growing
ashwaiyyat in Egypt. Khaled Youssef, the director of the film, collected captions like
‘The tumor of ashwaiyyat is spreading all over Egypt’ ‘Tombs turned into haphazard
houses’, and ‘Enough disasters’ that were laid against a bloody red background. In
contrast to what the images exposed, a rhythmic introductory song by a shaabi 124 voice
complaining:
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“I am not lucky enough. And it doesn’t fit me to fall in love. They say even the
blessing of sight is too much for us. And if we tried to find happiness they will destroy
our universe”
From the very first minutes, contradictory messages about the film were revealed;
slogans about the threat of ashwaiyyat to the rest of society, yet the lyrics spoke about the
deep pains of the people dwelling in them. Khaled Youssef and Nasser Abd Al Rahman,
director and scriptwriter, decided to address a popular half-hazard quarter and deliver a
shocking image of its reality to the middle class from which comes the majority of the
audience of contemporary Egyptian cinema. Khaled Youssef asserted this intention:
“Heen Maysara is a warning message for the whole society, government and
people, that the ashwaiyy quarters surrounding Cairo are occult bombs that may
explode anytime and for the weakest reasons in the face of the sophisticated
neighborhoods. The film also stresses that these areas became centers that provide
incubation for the destructive fanatics, homeless street children and unemployed
people who threaten those people around them by every means.” 125
“He is expressing the anxiety of his class; he makes a film about poor people to
avoid their explosion in the face of the middle class to which he belongs. He even said
that he directs his film to the government which is totally unthinkable, I couldn’t believe
this…” Awny resumed in our interview with remarkable irony. Youssef, though not
hiding the targeted audience and the ideological frame he is working within, always
claimed that he possessed a natural inclination to advocate for the poor classes and their
rights which is reflected in his movies. He also said that his film is speaking about the
completely disorganized society we all live in, where the political decisions, success,
failure and death are controlled by totally haphazard factors 126.
Youssef narrated in his film a tragedy based on three main stories occurring in
and around an informal poor quarter in Cairo. The first one was the story of Adel
Hashisha (a nickname related to hash) the principal male character in the film, who
struggles with his extremely constraining economic conditions. Compelled to afford the
expenses of living for his mother and sister’s numerous children, Hashisha finds himself
125
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involved in some illegal activities including drug dealing and thuggery as a means of
earning money and acquiring notability and relative authority inside his district. Hashisha
partly cooperates with the official security apparatus in reporting information about
Islamist groups working undercover in the locality. Security officers, in return, approve
of his position as an authority figure, thug and drug dealer. The film portrayed the
relationship between Hashisha and the senior security officer (responsible for his district)
that goes through ups and downs throughout the film.
The second story was that of Nahed, a poor girl that got involved in a sexual
relationship with Hashisha and became pregnant. When Hashisha rejected Nahed, her
lovechild using the keyword ‘Come back heen maysara’ or ‘whenever I have means to
afford our living’, Nahed escaped the house of her mother and her step father that keeps
harassing her relentlessly. She abandoned her son and fled to Alexandria in an attempt to
start living on her own. Given her status of poverty and illiteracy, Nahed worked as a
peddler until an old lady has pity on her when she saw her sleeping in the street, and took
her into her apartment which had a sea view in Alexandria. After the sudden death of the
lady, Nahed had to go back to the street, when the lady’s cruel sons accused her of
stealing their mother’s properties. During her constant attempts to find an alternative,
Nahed was subjected to rape and sexual abuse by almost all the people she encountered
in her journey (a young gambler and his friends, some drug addicts and a rich
homosexual woman who offered her to work as her maid). Eventually, Nahed became
more submissive to practice a sort of masked prostitution and worked for a businessman
who exploited her body for his business interests.
The sex scenes in the film were received with an intense hostility from the
conservative and religious members of the Egyptian society, particularly those depicting
a homosexual relationship between two women, rape scene, and sexual promiscuity
among ashwaiyyat inhabitants and street children. Islamic preachers in Al Azhar’s
Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs 127 and members of the Egyptian parliament
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demanded the film banned and that Khaled Youssef be charged of ‘assaulting the general
belief and value system in the Egyptian society after performing a scene of ‘lesbianism’
between the actresses Ghada Abd Al Razik and Somayya Al Khashab’ 128.
In the TV program “Al Kahira el youm” (Cairo Today), directly after the public
screening of Heen Maysara, the prominent Egyptian anchor Amr Adib interviewed
Youssef and the actors in the film. Amr introduced the episode with the following
speech:
“Prostitution, incest, adultery, illegal pregnancy, rape, hash and cocaine,
homosexuality among women, all in one place. This film lacks only an
earthquake, a flood and a volcano. It is a black document, no, it is sheer
blackness. And mark that, every five minutes the police attacks a certain site of
prostitution, gambling or drug dealing. It is a very exaggerated representation of
reality. In addition, this film was supposed to be classified ‘to watch with parental
guidance’. The head of the censorship apparatus on artistic productions should
quit his work. I am a liberal man, but I wouldn’t allow my son to watch two
women sleeping together with twenty pounds” 129
Similarly, in her TV program “The Difficult Choice” 130 on the official state TV,
the journalist Lamis Al Hadidy (the wife of Amr Adib) attacked Youssef aggressively
asking him: “Would you dare taking your son to watch this movie and see promiscuity,
homosexuality and ashwaiyyat?!! … ” Youssef answered: “Definitely, I took him
already, these scenes are essential because the main story is about how those people
capitalize on their body to earn their living as they have nothing else.” Youssef was
referring to the scene between the two actresses when Nahed said: “Don’t you have but
my body to take advantage of, men and women?” The lady replied: “And do you have
something else to be desired dear?” It is noteworthy that the scene was quiet short (40
seconds) and did not contain any explicit exposure of the actresses’ bodies.
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The way Adib and Al Hadidy ironically phrased their argument on the one hand,
and the adoption of such an extremist hostile discourse by religious and juridical
institutions on the other reflected facets of the intense debate raised by Heen Maysara
when screened in Egyptian theatres. Moreover, they exposed a deeper level of aversion
and anxiety towards the issues disclosed by the film and represented as part of the social
reality in ashwaiyyat.
It is noteworthy that the third plot line in the film was the story of Nahed and
Hashisha’s lovechild that was sold to a well-to-do upper middle class family where the
woman was unable to get pregnant. The family got rid of the boy as soon as the lady
became pregnant. The boy grew up as a homeless street child living with a big group of
children in the dusky foul corners of the immense city of Cairo. One of the hot points of
the debate about Heen Maysara was its scrutiny of the details of life of the group of adult
homeless boys and girls mapping out a picture of sexual promiscuity and beggary usually
met with disgust and rejection by members of upper classes. Ayman (the name given to
the boy) was claimed to be the father of another love child of one of the girls in the
group. After a quarrel about the real father, Ayman accepts the responsibility and decides
to take his new family and leave Cairo to try earning his living in a more merciful place.
Heen Maysara ends with Hashisha, Nahed and Ayman taking the same train, without
meeting or knowing each other, heading towards a gloomy future that awaits them after
escaping the pitiless capital. Khaled Youssef wrote the following apology on the final
titer: “I apologize for the people if I could not present their life as I saw it… Actually I
found the reality too cruel to be presented on the screen.”
However, this tragic view of the reality survived in ashwaiyyat did not appeal to a
wide range of critics and audience. Tarek Mosbah, critic and journalist, viewed the film
as based on a ‘totalitarian’ idea that dominated the whole plot and its diverse stories:
poverty and coercion results in hero necessarily becoming a religious extremist and the
heroin choosing moral deviation: “The film guides the viewer to one vision which is the
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director’s, and deploys the human suffering of those people in a vulgar commercial
context (referring to sex scenes and homosexual relationships).” 131
In one of the collective gatherings I held to examine people’s interpretations after
watching the film, Sherif Amer, an Egyptian engineer (26 years old), commented: “I
don’t like this dramatization by Khaled Youssef, I do agree that those people are really
poor and that the police is brutal. Yet, I would not believe this homeless boy admitting
being the father of the baby and refusing to repeat the cycle as his parents did.” Sherif’s
impression about the idealization of some characters in the film and the exaggerated
victimization of them is not understandable for May El Sayed (25 years old engineer),
another member of the group who reacted promptly: “But we cannot deny a feeling of
shame after watching the film, this is the reality, naked and painful, and we do nothing
for them.” In Al Riyad newspaper, the critic Samir Farid stated: “This is one of the best
films of Youssef, and this is the real status in Egypt” 132. The famous director, Daod Abd
El Sayed, who previously presented ashwaiyyat and poor classes in two masterpieces Al
Kit Kat (1991) and Sarek El Farah (The Thief of Happiness- 1994), agreed with Farid:
“Regardless of the artistic quality, it is important to see again films that treat such critical
causes and crises survived by the Egyptian society instead of films without any value” 133.
From another perspective, the film may have gained such sympathy because it
tackled a topic that in recent years already pervaded Egyptian media stories and articles.
Many writers and researchers described a certain commonality between the reality that
the middle and upper classes survive in their localities and that of ashwaiyy quarters. The
scenes of chaotic practices and the informal law and thuggery were part of lived reality in
contemporary Egyptian society regardless of the class position or the economic situation.
Diaa Rashwan 134 argued:
“Tracing the current accidents of the business upper class in Egypt in recent years,
demonstrate that we are facing a quiet similar behavioral model to that in
ashwaiyyat. The only difference is the amount of wealth and the places and
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relations involved in those incidents. Drug trade, drug consumption, hiring
baltaggiya (thugs) or bodyguards, illegal acquisition of state properties, sexual
violations and perversions, polygamy and physical aggression not ending by
killing for vengeance and other ‘ghastly’ scenes. They all look analogous are
common to those who lie at the bottom of the society and those who monopolize
the top. The difference between what happens in the bottom and what happens on
the top is that the former looks primitive and crude without make- up or
beautification, all the illegal or criminal behaviors are obvious, while the latter is
always bound by secrecy behind the fences of the closed areas inhabited by upper
class members” 135.
What Rashwan identified is consistent with a vague sense of fear that prevails
among some Egyptian intellectuals and lay people about the shrinkage of the middle class
and the widening gap between classes. In one of my interviews, Ahmed Fawzy, a young
Egyptian film maker (31 years old), admitted this fear:
“The middle class nowadays is living a nightmare, a man works in a bank for
twenty hours to be able to buy an apartment and improve his social status, yet
the chaotic rules of the market make him always insecure no matter what his
capabilities are, he wants to escape his present conditions, it’s decomposing
and you have to choose, to ascend or descend, this insecurity is now
preoccupying middle class minds”.
Galal Amin postulates different reasons rendering the Egyptian middle class less
distinguishable from the lower classes. Among these reasons, as Amin argued, are the
high unemployment rates, diminishing numbers of Egyptian labor in Gulf countries since
1986, vanishing state subsidization and expenditure following agreements with the World
Bank in 1991 and increased rates of consumption among classes 136. Amin describes the
middle class predicament as follows:
“One walks the streets, uses the various transport means, goes to cafes and
restaurants and universities, sees young boys and girls in their schools and
walking by the Nile, and one sees nothing but ‘middle class’. No one looks
distinguished from the other from a class perspective, except for poor exhausted
peddlers, skinny security officers, or poor farmers. Except for these examples, all
the rest look ‘middle class’. The question is whether this class disappeared or
dissolved in the lower classes that both of them form a big amalgamated mass
struggling with the same problems and having the same hopes (or rather having
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lost the same hopes). It is now very difficult to categorize them according to the
old classification”. 137
Amin with such a sorrowful article adopts a classical middle class discourse that
has dominated the Egyptian media over the last ten years. This discourse links the
crumpling of a threatened middle class to the broader collapse of the ambitions of the
national welfare project and modernity (see chapter three). However, while stressing the
importance of the middle class and glorifying its achievements, middle class intellectuals
cannot hide an envious appreciation of the upper classes and a deeply seated despise for
the poor people dwelling in ashwaiyyat. Rashwan’s language is but one illustration:
“The traditional view is that such a pervert and disfigured social model reins the
Ashwaiyyat at the bottom of society, but when it prevails at the top of it, this
means that the whole society is moving towards a tremendous disaster. However,
the rapidity and danger of this disaster increase when the middle class (always the
guardian of the stability of the society) had reached a complete decline in all the
economic, social, cultural and moral dimensions of the word. This decline
happened after the transformations carried out by the political regime under the
leadership of the business class due to a set of powerful knock outs that
dismantled its internal coherence” 138.
Farha Ghannam, in her fieldwok in Zawiyya 139, maps out how the middle and
upper classes view the newly constructed urban expansions of Cairo and their inhabitants.
She describes how they perceive them as remote places housing drug dealers, criminals
and trouble makers. Ashwaiyyat in Ghannam’s work, are publicly seen as places lacking
the authenticity of the old Cairo quarters and the luxury of its rich ones. They are
considered outcasts on the urban landscape and rather representing as she depicts
extensions of the ‘rifi (rural) subculture’ that bears attachments to the local custom in the
first place.
Loathe for ashwaiyyat residents was tackled by Heen Maysara in a climactic
point where the anxiety of the educated and supposedly privileged middle class is
extensively provoked by the economic difficulties. Their reactions, whether positive or
137
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negative, can be read as expressive of how they see themselves and how they relate to the
‘others’ dwelling in ashwaiyyat, while haunted by obsessions of ascension and decline.
A conversation between Adib in “Cairo today” and Wafaa Amer, one of the
actresses in Heen Maysara, bespeaks the distance between the representation and the
venture of the public gaze of the middle class towards the poor:
Wafaa: I exposed myself to the sun, I acted without make-up, to look like ‘those
people’. I cut my nails for my hands to look like their hands in reality.
Amr (mocking): Anyways, we could ‘smell’ the reality on our seats in cinema
theatres.
Wafaa: No, smell is not part of my performance, I used perfumes though…

4.3. “El Lemby”: Against the rhetoric

Unlike Heen Maysara, the film makers of El Lemby announced from the very first
scenes that they will make fun of the rhetoric of the traditional middle class movies 140.
After a long cynical chat with a police officer asking to see his ID, El Lemby gets back to
his district, stoned as usual, singing with apparent incoherence: “All the people stood up
witnessing how I found the bases of glory by my own… “, the famous verse of the poem
“Egypt speaks about herself” by acclaimed poet Hafez Ibrahim. The Egyptian legendary
singer Um Kulthum sang this poem in October 30th 1952, marking the beginning of a
new era of independence of the Egyptian state. Since then, this song has been played in
all national celebrations signifying the values of independence and liberation while
referencing to a glorious past and a promising future.
Regardless of the impossibility in real life of choosing this song as one to reiterate
while going back home stoned at night (given its difficult classical Arabic poetry,
character of the subject, and El Lemby’s impaired pronunciation), the film-makers
insisted on invoking the song directly after the humiliating chat with the officer who
kicked El Lemby out of the street of a descent quarter. “The emergence of El Lemby was
against the moralities of the middle class who worships superman and positive heroes”
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wrote Wael Abd Elfattah in ‘Soot El Ummah’ newspaper 141 analyzing the phenomena of
new cinema stars in the contemporary Egyptian cinema. Abd Elfattah was referring to the
simple story about a frustrated man trying desperately to earn his living through minor
jobs (renting bicycles for tourists in Sharm El Sheikh and selling lamb liver sandwiches
in the street) and never succeeding. The perpetual failure of El Lemby was the main
theme that substituted the conventional theme of ascension that dominates the stories of
the Egyptian cinema and particularly those films starred by middle and upper class
heroes. Ahmed Fawzy (29 years old, film-maker) thinks that Mohamed Saad had a class
consciousness that disappeared soon after El Lemby (part 1). Fawzy argues: “He ended up
becoming rich at the end of his movies and having a nice house and a beautiful wife, like
80- 90% of the movies nowadays, the ascension theme is indispensable. The remaining
10% used to present the absurdity theme like El Lemby”
In 2002, the actor Mohamed Saad (1965- present) starred El Lemby in which he
presented a caricaturist profile of a poor ashwaiyy quarter resident who cannot find
appropriate work and keeps searching for a venue to make money and pay a debt of
another resident. The film was the biggest box- office of the year and continued to be
shown in movie theatres for seventeen consecutive weeks with unprecedented revenues
of twenty two million Egyptian pounds 142. El Lemby had a distorted linguistic structure
and a creepy pronunciation of words in addition to the constantly stoned mannerisms due
to his continuous consumption of hash (always available in his quarter). All these features
were deployed to present a heavily sarcastic comedy that set new records in the number
of its cinema viewers.
Safinaz Kazem 143 writing in Al Hilal magazine in September 2002 described El
Lemby as a popular hero who used a language that expressed his relation to the difficult
circumstances and the daily oppression that he faced by bureaucrats and police officers in
his continuous attempts to find a job. El Lemby’s language had an unusual logic where
the words are detached from their original contexts to get allocated in totally different
141
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context for sarcastic purposes. The same phenomenon was described in Togo by C.
Toulabor in his study about ‘political derision’ in 1986 144. Mbembe cites Toulabor
explaining the phenomenon:
“He shows how, under one- party rule, citizens developed ways of separating
words or phrases from their conventional meanings and using them in quite other
sense. He illustrates how they thus built a whole vocabulary, equivocal and
ambiguous, parallel to the official discourse” 145
According to Kazem, El Lemby talked incoherently and uses vague sounds to
deal with the fragmentation of his reality. Incoherence and vagueness of language were
not only symbolic of a cynical attitude but also verbalized the high sense of bitterness and
absurdity dominating the dramatic situations. The hero in the film was living a messy life
devoid of meaning and achievement inside his impoverished hectic quarter. Deprived
from the basic needs of housing, work and dignified life, El Lemby, in Kazem’s view,
symbolized the hurtful case of a majority of the poor and marginalized Egyptians imbued
with resentment and repressed anger.
However, El Lemby succeeded in all movie theatres including those in Cairo’s
huge and glamorous shopping malls where viewers are mostly upper middle class
youngsters who probably never had been to slums and ashwaiyy quarters before. The
majority of Egyptian intellectuals, artists and media professionals heavily criticized the
film and accused Saad and the director of the film Wael Ehsan of spoiling young
generations, corrupting the Arabic language and misrepresenting social moralities and
ideals 146. Tarek Al Shenawi 147 the well known cinema critic asserts:
“From my experience and my very intimate connection and loyalty to the art of
cinema, I feel guilty calling ‘El Lemby’ a film, and despite that I can see the
societal need that brought this character to stardom, However, I would not merge
both things and admit that it is a good film”
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Interviews and conversations of viewers produced similar reactions: “There is no film, it
is a sequence of disconnected scenes meant only to make the audience laugh” commented
Myvel Seddik 148 (27 years old) in a personal interview, refusing any considerate
descriptions about the film as representing a bitter social reality. Saif Salah (31 years old)
disagrees totally with this opinion during an accidental conversation about the movie:

“El Lemby may be a bad movie from technical point of view, but I am definitely
with that, it is impossible to be dramatically logical in such a film, he was
rebelling against everything even the idea of the dramatic sequence itself, his idea
was that all these clichés are nonsense, we cannot judge El Lemby from this
perspective, it has other aesthetic values. I think that this vision happened
unconsciously and if it was planned consciously it would be a great film that
theorizes the absurdity of our reality, characters who behave without logic, the
soundtrack that does not relate to the scenes; but it is more likely to believe that it
is a mere commercial exploitation of the previous success of El Lemby character
in Al Nazer.” 149
If we contemplate the set of opinions and reactions to Heen Maysara and El
Lemby, we can deduce that most part of the debate was related to their conformity to the
social reality in contemporary Egypt, not only in poor quarters but also in the supposedly
well-off ones. And though media productions are usually received as imaginary
representation of the reality not reality itself, the provoked public opinion could not help
getting engaged with the assumptions implied in both films. The receptive audience (in
my sample) spontaneously tended to sum up their reactions to the films by stating to what
extent they are real and to what degree such precariousness is prevalent in the Egyptian
society altogether. The researcher Amr El Shboky 150 goes further in affirming that the
whole society is facing decline always pointing out ashwaiyyat as the bad model that all
society joins:
“When an entire country turns to be a meeting point of ashwaiyyat, no distinction
between rich and poor, educated and illiterate, a refined or a poor quarter, the
whole people lives in mobile ashwaiyyat; in houses, streets, work and even
beaches, it becomes difficult for this ashwaiyy (disorganized) country to escape
any sort of crises, especially that its capability of contrivance is fed up since we
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are very close- much more than the state imagines- to the end of a phase of the
affirmation of chaos and the absence of law” 151.
This anxious tone of Al Shobky affirms again the fears that prevailed among the
Egyptian middle class. My argument is that films like El Lemby and Heen Maysara could
be viewed as a reaction to these fears. The middle class – represented in both producers
and consumers – tries to reset the distance that separates them from ashwaiyyat through
this fear. Egyptian middle class viewers project their obsessions about decline and
joining poor classes on the ashwaiyyat characters presented in cinema. The ritual of
watching cinema as evidenced in this case implies processes of classification and
exclusion. The middle class re-defines the poor people as something to which it does not
belong. The de-humanization of the poor in ashwaiyyat by turning them into ‘creatures’
that behave, move and talk in a completely different way than ‘ours’ affirms their
claimed threat (see Khaled Youssef’s caption p. 60) and legitimizes the social exclusion
practiced against them.
I also argue that the hegemony of the state in contemporary Egypt, under the
current rule of Hosni Mubarak (1981-present), propels the internal dialogue of fear
among the middle class and enhances its rush to rearrange the class map in Egypt. The
social subconscious, eager to achieve this rearrangement, is translated on cinema screens.
Characterizing and synthesizing the poor as the rejected ‘other’ in El Lemby and Heen
Maysara, sensitizes the middle class against the naturalization of the threat of poverty
and collapse. Moreover, it guards the levels of social denial of the prevalent violence and
the disorganization that infiltrate the comportment of the middle and upper classes in a
very similar fashion to ashwaiyyat (see Rashwan and Shobky observations detailed
earlier). In what follows, I investigate how these arguments are realized in both films and
how the influence of the sociopolitical context and the middle class predicament
contributed to their making and reception.
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4.4. Social Exclusion and Representing the De-politicized

“In the old days, a very big battle occurred in the country, during the central
security forces rebel, the tanks (Dababat said the wrong way Dabdabat) were
in the streets, and they announced a curfew (Hazr tagawwol said Haz’
tagawwol to mean ‘straining’), your brother didn’t care and went down the
street , me too went to watch this haz’ tagawwol, we walked in the streets in
the middle of dabdabat, nobody asked us who you are or even felt our
presence, your brother said: What is this? We don’t exist or we are invisible? It
seems Adel that we came to this world and we’ll leave it unnoticed. I don’t
know why I had this urge to have children, I swear (to divorce my wife) I am a
donkey, thanks god the doctor told me I am infertile, Would I have children to
come to the world and leave it unnoticed?! Forget about it… “
Fathi, the friend of Adel Hashisha in Heen Maysara, was narrating his story to
Hashisha by the Nile after making sure that his infertility disorder is untreatable. Fathi
kept denying this fact for a long time, living for years with his wife and accusing her of
being the reason behind not having kids. Fathi even married another younger wife
claiming that he is going to have a ‘twin’. Fathi who smokes hash unremittingly and has a
distorted pronunciation resembles El Lemby in many features. The tonal shift that Fathi
makes in his pronunciation of the complicated terms used in the official discourse (like
Hazr Tagawwol) to change their meanings to metaphors, always obsessed with body
orifices, ignites popular laughter for their implicit criticism of the commandment as
Mbembe states:
“Beyond specifically the mouth, belly and phallus, the body is the principal locale
of the idioms and fantasies used in depicting power. If indeed it is the festivities
and celebrations that are the vehicles for giving expression to the commandment
and for staging its displays of magnificence and prodigality, then the body in
question is first a body that eats and drinks, and second a body that is open in both
ways: hence the significance given to the orifices, and the central part they play in
people’s political humor” 152
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The similarity in language between Fathi and El Lemby is one of the features of a
profound sentiment of meaninglessness and disintegration. Wael Abd Elfattah describes
El Lemby as a defeated hero:
“Nothing makes him a hero but his repetitive defeats in life. Not an ‘anti- hero’
like Robert De Nero in “Taxi driver”, El Lemby and his resemblances are heroes
without heroism, they would not support fake moralities, their values are harsh,
everyday without big ideas, sensual without heavy mentality” 153
Abd Elfattah presumes that this is the theme that the audience liked much:
“Seeing themselves in a mirror and rediscovering the image lost in media representations
that do not usually admit but ‘cultivated’ images about the poor”. Many writers and
analysts were preoccupied with the secret of the huge success of both characters and their
great appeal to the audience. And like Abd Elfattah, many of them admitted that audience
sympathy is due to a mysterious feeling that these representations could grasp the core of
this audience’s behavior: “You know what, I feel El Lemby is not like real life, he’s too
naïve and kind, and the film is very abstract, his incoherence and disorganization is more
of a simulation of the mental status of the whole country”, commented Saif Salah after
the collective group watching of El Lemby (part 1). In his scrutiny of caricaturist
representations in Cameroon, Achille Mbembe explains how the audience experiences
such a moment of empathy with characters in representations:
“He manages to abolish and maintain distance at one and the same time, since he
is both remote and close, the obverse and the reverse, that ‘something’ that is
present for us not only because it is displayed and we experience it- we
experience the thing- but, more decisively, because it is the very thing of our
experience: tangible, palpable, and visible, but at the same time secret and distantin short, a ‘non- localized universal presence”. 154
The feelings of being marginalized and unaccountable described by Fathi in the
scene by the Nile are very common with El Lemby. After one of the attacks when the
police crushed his cart for selling lamb liver sandwiches, El Lemby told his friends while
smoking hash:
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“Why I wasn’t born a chicken? At least I would only lay eggs, but you know what,
even if I was a hen there still will be an unbearable cock who gives me hard time,
like this one who smashed my cart today, I kept screaming and begging him ‘please
sir, I will lose everything, and he didn’t even reply”
El Lemby and Fathi in many respects were a prototype of the ‘common person’ in Egypt;
vulgarly carved from day to day by the harshness of the situation, humiliated by the
police, haunted by the search for subsistence and the fear of having nothing. This
prototype is not necessarily related to being in ashwaiyyat, poor, or uneducated as the
public discourse tends to correlate them. Farha Ghannam denies this correlation in her
account about Al Zawiyya 155 in Egypt:
“There are families with relatively high income, especially those whose members
are skilled workers or who work in oil- producing countries, and there are
unskilled workers with little income who can hardly sustain their families. A man
may, for example, work during the day as a teacher in a professional school where
he earns around one hundred Egyptian pounds per month and work as house
painter in the evening, which earns him more than two hundred pounds” 156.
This description of the locality considered an ashwaiyyat befits many traditional
middle class families in old Cairo like Mounira and Sayyeda Zeinab. Similarly, the level
of education does not guarantee that the educated middle class would not speak or behave
like El Lemby: “My friend with a bachelor of commerce from the University of
Alexandria speaks exactly like El Lemby”, said Sherif Amer (in the gathering to watch
the movie). Bryan Bary 157 asserts that social exclusion cannot only be premised on
income or education levels but is also related to several parameters of inclusion within
the public frameworks of approval and participation:
“Social exclusion is a distinguishable phenomenon from poverty and economic
inequality. However, there is a correlation between the distribution of income and
social exclusion though not a direct one, because this relation emerges through
surviving a common fate and participating in the public institutions. The individual
income’s relation to his/ her ability of participation is dependent on the extent to
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which all people profit from these institutions for free and with big support from
the part of the state” 158.
Bary’s analysis challenges us to perceive social exclusion of certain social strata as
more general phenomenon, where state policies and government practices are at stake.
Bary identifies social exclusion as “the case of an individual in the society dwelling in a
certain region but for reasons beyond his/ her control cannot participate in the everyday
activities of citizens in his society while he/she is positive in the desire to participate” 159.
Assef Bayat asserts that in the Egyptian context, ashwaiyyat cannot be simply classified
as spaces that harbor only the poor:
“The ashwaiyyat are not simply exclusive poverty belts but the home of many
middle-class urbanites, professionals and civil servants. What perhaps may breed
lawlessness is not the cultural essentials of residents, but, rather, the consequences
of their being perceived as outsiders and of the density and lack of spatial clarities
of the communities. An outsider community, even if located in the heart of a city,
by definition lacks street names, house numbers, maps, a police presence, paved
roads for police cars and, thus, state control” 160
In her study about the film “Salam Bombay” 161 Salwa Bakr argues that the
implementation of the capitalist modes of production in third world countries in
particular, neglects planning for connecting economic production to people’s actual
needs. This discrepancy results in the social exclusion and marginalization of the human
resources that exceed the requirements of the production system. This group of people, as
Bakr states, “does not possess any skills or expertise that qualifies them to participate in
public affairs or public decisions or even in the individual daily affairs that matter for
them”.
This argument may partly interpret how the representation of the ashwaiyyat
residents in El Lemby and Heen Maysara tackled the issue of social exclusion that
encompassed not only the lower classes who suffer from the lack of education and skills,
but also the middle class that struggles with the implementation of the neoliberal
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economic programs in Egypt (See Chapter 3). This representation of the marginalized
stimulated the audience to re-think the traits of the ashwaiyyat residents, as presented in
the films, within the framework of social exclusion. These characteristics could be
summed up in the following: lack of skills and expertise in any of the fields of production
or social services, absence from all sorts of economic activity, being invisibly on the
national/public income charts, and disengagement from all public institutions like
education and law. These criteria, in my view, reduce the relation between this group of
people and the state to the limited boundaries of the policing and disciplining institutions
as criminality turns to be the only linkage left between “those people” and the civic arena
surrounding them

4.5. The Egyptian State and Disseminating the Discourse of Absurdity

When we contemplate some changes in state/citizen relation under Mubarak we can
better grasp mechanisms of exclusion from the social and political public spheres. This
exclusion can be interpreted as part of techniques of the state aiming at maintaining its
hegemony on the political life in Egypt and excluding its opponents from the circles of
power that influence the decision-making processes. In this respect, it would be important
to follow the study of Michel-Rolph Trouillot 162 about the way the Duvaliers in Haiti
solidified their dictatorship between 1957- 1964. Trouillot distinguishes between a
conventional dictatorship and an unconventional dictatorship that deploys different
mechanisms that escalate its abuse of power to unprecedented limits. He identifies a set
of processes that induced a qualitative change in the nature of authoritarianism. I rely on
his analysis to interpret transformations in the state mechanisms of action in Egypt (20022008):
“Put thus, it becomes immediately apparent that the differences that distinguished
the regimes of the two Duvaliers from those that preceded them were not merely
quantitative. Sometime around 1961- 1965, the accumulation of these differences
and the extent of their growth transformed differences of degree into structural
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innovations. The state had broken through the culturally specific limits of
authoritarianism.” 163
By “the culturally specific limits of authoritarianism” Trouillot means a set of
implicit social codes that influence and control state’s decision to use its power or
legitimate violence in a traditional dictatorship. Violating these codes bears a symbolic
value indicating that the state is going beyond the limits by its dictators. This misuse of
power in contemporary Egypt was intentionally planned and carried out, in my view,
through two main procedures.
The first procedure is the intentional destruction of civil society institutions that
achieved a certain amount of credibility and independence before 2005, a process I
discussed in chapter three. The Egyptian regime following the emergence of some active
and influential social movements in 2005 embarked on a series of measures of hostility
and aggression towards the civil society institutions like political parties, independent
social movements, NGOs, human rights activists, media channels and personnel and even
independent intellectuals. The Egyptian regime also managed to act on the symbolic level
by disseminating an unsympathetic tone about its opponents, claiming they were agents
of the US or were dependent on Western funding and agenda 164. The regime benefited as
well from its heritage of a privileged autocratic class and its bureaucratic agents who
were distributed to combat the growing influence of civil society. The Egyptian state
succeeded in propagating a sense of despair about potential reform, as it proved an
indisputable ability to polarize the nation into allies and enemies of the regime. Trouillot
scrutinizes a similar process in Haiti:
“The formalization of the crisis implied the institutionalization of the split
between political and civil society: The chief of the state swallowed up the entire
executive branch, the executive engulfed the state and the state engulfed the
nation. Each process occurred in part because of the weakness of the national
institutions and the lack of vision of the so- called political elites” 165.
Such polarization processes were regularly carried out by attracting the political
and intellectual elite in Egypt to join the ruling NDP (National Democratic Party) and
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portraying the opposition parties as weak and non-influential opponents. 166 The state
autocrats and the security apparatus were allowed to commit violent acts of detention and
physical torture towards prominent symbols of the Egyptian opposition like Ayman
Nour 167 and Abd Elhalim Kandil 168.
This behavior, in my judgment, intensified the internal social conflict between
members of the civil society on the one hand, and state agents distributed in several
sectors and in innumerable institutions on the other. The Egyptian state turned its
monopoly of the use of legitimate violence to a quotidian practice that state
representatives in their respective sites were allowed to use against other citizens. The
legitimization of violence as non-political action on part of the state, but rather accepting
violence as social and as occurring on daily basis, created conflicting social groups and
nurtured a one-to-one violent behavior in daily life. Trouillot explains that the
maintenance of such a state of generalized violence requires a massive mobilization of
the regime’s allies in the different sectors:
“The principal organizers came from the parasitic strata attached to the dominant
alliance: Professionals, artisans, petty bureaucrats. But the ranks of the ton-ton
makeout, as well as those of the civil militia, included members from all social
classes. The active participation of wide range of the population won at least a
minimum of social acceptance for the totalitarian code of state violence. Few
people may have been ready to proclaim their willingness to commit any crime on
behalf of the regime, but there were enough to act as if they were- and enough to
replace them when they themselves disappeared” 169.
The process of separating the social from the political authorized individual
violence and jeopardized the burgeoning democratic steps of the Egyptian civil society.
Moreover, it consolidated the transformation of state-citizen relationship into one that is
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premised on citizens being merely subordinate subjects to the state. Subjects became
depoliticized and disintegrated within the political domain.
This sort of exclusion encompassed those involved in the political sphere whether
as activists or subjects affected by decision-making processes. These strata, no matter to
what class they belonged, struggled with their marginalization from the public sphere
even though they might not be economically marginalized. Ahmed Awny in a personal
interview explained:
“There are many issues more pressing than food, water and income, there is an
actual crisis and suffocating conditions for all the upper class members who live
an everyday contradiction between their ambitions about an open society and the
brutally repressive political context, even the American University students who
are supposedly allowed relative freedom of expression discovered that the
security forces are awaiting them outside the fences when they were detained and
beaten during the April 6th strike demonstrations in 2008.”

4.6. Inefficiency and Hopelessness

The second mechanism that the Mubarak regime deployed to achieve its
dominance and perpetuate the subordination of its subjects was institutionalizing the
sense of absurdity in public discourse and the reign of inefficiency in public institutions.
Horrible accidents proved a substantial failure of the executive and administrative
sectors. Many examples could be provided to substantiate the state’s failure in managing
the severe crises that hit the country lately, the worst of them were the water crises of
2007 where dwellers of thousands of Egyptian villages and towns were suddenly cut of
water supply (Al Masry Al Youm, 2007). Al Doweka catastrophe of 2008 was another
instance, when a cliff collapsed on the eastern edge of Cairo hurling giant boulders on top
of poor slum dwellings that had been illegally erected, in defiance of constant warnings
that the site was unsafe. The rock’s slide buried dozens, perhaps hundreds, of residents
alive. Locals complained that long-promised alternative housing had been given to
friends and relations of government officials, rather than the needy (The Economist,
2008). Focusing on Haiti’s Duvallier’s dictatorship Trouillot’s words find resonance int
eh case of Egypt:
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“The Duvalierist state had to tolerate inefficiency, irrespective of the intentions or
competence of individual members of the administration. Inefficiency (not
incompetence) became the structural precondition for the maintenance of the
Duvalier’s power” 170.
Perpetuating inefficiency gradually pervaded the Egyptian public domain
culminating in apathy and indifference. Poverty and the widening gap between social
classes became more and more palpable within Cairo’s popular quarters and throughout
Egypt, despite government pronouncements about the positive progress of economic
reform:
“Then, as now, the gap between a very rich few and the teeming mass of havenots seemed to yawn ever wider. Then, 2,000 vast estates occupied half of
Egypt’s fertile land, while millions of illiterate peasants toiled as sharecroppers.
Today, 44% of Egyptians still count as poor or extremely poor, with some 2.6m
people so destitute that their entire income cannot cover basic food needs, let
alone other expenses. Yet ranks of private jets clutter Cairo’s airport. The flower
arrangements at a recent posh wedding, where whisky flowed and the gowns
fluttered in from Paris and Milan, were reputed to have cost $60,000 in a country
where the average wage is less than $100 a month” (The Economist 2008).
Disseminating a general feeling of hopelessness and frustration was an important
tool to make people surrender to the ruling regime and to accept its absolute domination
over social and political life. This submissiveness weakened the collective belief in the
political mechanisms of social change (like democratic elections) and provided the
regime with prerogative to even survive for longer periods.
Fathi and El Lemby, in my opinion, could verbalize the state of ‘collective
marginalization’ that fills the hearts of the Egyptians who watched the films. Khairy
Bishara elaborates:
“El Lemby and other films of the sort can all be put in the context of ‘looking for
absurdity’ that dominates the cinema nowadays; characters who say vague words
yet understandable by the audience, ideas that nobody want to concentrate in,
crazy acts, funny walks and slap- stick exaggerated voices. These are the real
films expressing youth views of today. Other silly commercial films that portray a
falsified bias for causes like patriotism and Arab unity are mere nonsense” 171
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What appeared liberating in the depiction of the daily life of El Lemby is his
withdrawal and even mockery of all patriotic belonging or nationalistic affiliation, tropes
usually imposed on the dramatic context in the majority of the Egyptian films. This
absence of belonging brilliantly grasps the status of non-civic citizens/subjects who have
no space within public institutions. Heen Maysara and El Lemby provided a
representation where all the attempts of joining the approved modern state institutions
seem fake and falsified. The ashwaiyyat resident, in many aspects like the rest of Egypt’s
residents, deals predominantly with one state institution namely the police. Beside this
institution, the films portrayed the emptiness of the social space from other venues of
public participation, a point on which Tarek Al Shinawi elaborates:
“This cinema can be easily tied to the contemporary political context that
announces all the time that there is no collective project for the nation, we had
socialism then liberalization of economy then nothing, no collective thoughts and
no collective targets. It is not the cinema that created absurdity and exclusion; it is
the political situation that created them. All the people need to get rid of any
meaning to be able to survive and absurdity must prevail in such
circumstances” 172

172

. Personal Interview with Al Shinawi in October 2008.

81

Chapter Five

Behind Viewership and Consumption: Class Racism and the ‘Othering’ of the Poor

5.1. Introduction

In the last chapter I outlined diverse readings of Heen Maysara and El Lemby
which contended that the big success they achieved was reflective of a true empathy with
the characters’ marginalized position. Lack of education and poverty were interpreted as
symptoms of a more serious social condition where different social strata suffer from the
haphazardness of the system and the ‘rule of impunity’, in various degrees. The films
portrayed the societal disintegration and exclusion from the domains that create the
‘collective sentiment’ and enhance active participation in the public sphere. The sense of
‘absurdity’ pervading broader sectors beyond the ones represented in the films was
behind the wide reception and the commotion that accompanied the films’ screenings.
However, this sense of absurdity produces different reactions than passive
empathy. The debates accompanying the films demonstrate that despite consensus on the
systemic nature of disorganization and deterioration on many levels, middle class
producers and audience reproduce the distinctive boundaries between classes. The
cultural bourgeoisie establishes a double standard position of reception through which it
is able to sympathize yet reproduce a ‘class racist’ view of the poor classes. Pierre
Bourdieu highlights the notion of ‘class racism’ that characterizes the cultural
bourgeoisie’s practices to distinguish itself from what is perceived as congenitally
primitive, coarse and vulgar lower classes. In this chapter, I will decipher this duality of
reception and how the cultural bourgeoisie’s applause or attack on Heen Maysara and El
Lemby implies dimensions of violence and class racism.
I rely on Bourdieu’s framework on class position within his analysis of taste and
how it relates to cultural production. He argues that the social position and authority
guaranteed to a certain member of society is related to the amount of capital he/she holds.
This capital is mainly an ‘economic capital’ represented in a ‘cultural capital’ which
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conveys the share and impact of this person on the dominant culture. Bourdieu postulates
that the dominant cultural discourses and art reflect the taste of the dominant social
classes:
“Taste is a practical mastery of distributions which make it possible to sense or
intuit what is likely (or not likely) to befall- and therefore to befit- an individual
occupying a given position in social space. It functions as a sort of social
orientation, a sense of one’s place” 173.
Building on this conception of taste, Bourdieu argues that the cultural bourgeoisie
commands, thanks to its economic capital and its natural disposition (habitus) 174,
symbolic power that determines what sort of art is refined and beautiful according to its
tendencies and preferences. Gradually, the taste of the cultural bourgeoisie is naturalized
and infused in the social imaginary as the appropriate form of art regardless of the
original classification and class categories it represents. According to Bourdieu, such
naturalization intends to confer legacy and normalcy to the political and economic
hegemony of the bourgeois classes through asserting their cultural privilege and
sanctioning their opinion about the appropriated forms of art 175.
Yet, the Egyptian film productions after 1970 exposed a deep contradiction in the
reception process of this hegemonic cultural bourgeoisie in Egypt. Since 1970 Egyptian
cinema started to portray the lower classes in films whose viewers are mostly from the
middle and upper classes. The upper and middle classes were represented as less
powerful and dominant. In contrast, the vulgar mannerisms and expressions of the lower
classes were represented as prevalent and more appealing. The cinematic characters of
the lower classes embodied by the comedian Adel Emam 176(1940- present) in the 1970s
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and 1980s achieved a great success among the middle and upper class audience. Many
comic quotes from Emam’s movies are still remembered and deployed in everyday life
situations by many Egyptians regardless of their class position 177. These media
productions were still aggressively criticized in the official media as a kind of ‘bad art’, at
the same time they were collecting high revenues in the box- office placing Emam on the
top of the Egyptian cinema charts as the most popular star in the entire modern history of
Egypt 178.
I argue in this chapter that this contradiction (featuring lower classes and being
successfully received by upper classes) is governing the reception of Heen Maysara and
El Lemby as well, but in a more aggressive way. The rituals of viewership of the two
films combines violence and laughter and makes of sympathy with the poor a formal
façade behind which the upper classes establish more distance from the poor. Moreover, I
assume that this contradictory relation to the films reflects dynamic of state/subjects
relations in many dimensions. Class racism and violence disclosed in the films and partly
in their reception reproduce in many respects the relation between the ruling power and
the subordinate subjects. The middle class viewers judge Heen Maysara and El Lemby
from a higher position that enable them to distance their practices from these
representations. Their depiction of the vulgarity of the characters in both films implies a
defensive strategy against the possible merger of their world with that of ashwaiyyat.

5.2. Acquiring Simultaneous Disgust and Appeal

In 2002 the representation of the lower classes began to take a different pathway
where vulgar mannerisms, language and pronunciation disorders, and a focus on
formalities were stressed as the main features of the lower class image in cinema. This
Tradition in Egypt”, in Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics, No. 15, Arab Cinematics: Toward the New
and the Alternative, pp. 81- 129).
177
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Sakhen (Ragab on top of a hot tank 1979), Shaaban Taht Al Sifr (Shaaban subzero 1980), El Halfoot (The
pauper 1985). These films focused on the rapid ascension of nouveaux riches after the implementation of
the open door policies and the exploitation of the poor characters embodied by Emam.
178
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kind of representation is an inversion of a tradition that was established in the 1980s and
1990s thanks to the young generation of film makers that appeared in Egypt at the
time 179. The films of this group of film makers presented the poor classes’ life from a
humanistic and more realistic point of view. Khairy Bishara claims:
“We had a different concern, I wanted to say that all this ascension is fake, and
these acquisitions that the poor get are not for real and will be robbed from them,
and this is an infinite cycle and a game that is bigger than what you think, you
will not be one of them so be yourself, this was my understanding of a progressive
thought… “
I presume that the repetitive representation of the lower classes in the Egyptian
cinema after 2002, symbolizes a disjuncture of the classical class hierarchy and taste that
used to influence film production in Egypt. The environment that gave rise to Bishara and
his generation’s films in the 1980s and 1990s was quiet different. Bishara explains:
“In this period, we saw ourselves as the avant-garde that appreciates ‘culture’. We
were making movies of the cultural elite speaking about the poor classes.
Nowadays, the film makers are closer to the everyday life of their audience,
consumers like them and struggling with the same problems, so if they were
making my film ‘Kaboria’ (Crab) 180 today they would make my hero succeed to
marry the wealthy lady and become rich.”
Bishara’s comment affirms the difference in how media representations of the
poor after 2002 established a shallow relation with the social reality. Representation is
much closer to reality and adopting its rough facets, yet it does not address the underlying
complexities of poverty and marginality. Heroism of the marginalized in films after 2002
became a necessity even if it lacks substance. The audience is less tolerant of a human
character that lives a multi-layered reality imbued with frustration and disintegration. The
absurdity that El Lemby, Hashisha and Fathi survive is harsh yet it still fills the dramatic
text with laughter and jokes. The heroes, always victorious at the end, tell infinite jokes
and a lot of wisdom with the same impaired pronunciation and incoherence. Their jokes
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ignite laughter of their audience and their wisdom and victory asserts their heroism and
declares their success to substitute the old ‘middle class’ superman. Wael Abd El Fattah
sums up the difference between the ‘marginalized’ in the 1980s and 2002:
“Even the idea of the ‘marginalized’ that the critics announced as the heroes of
the 1980s cinema (Mohamed Khan, Khairy Bishara, Daod Abd El Sayed and
Radwan El Kashif…), did not present the wretched in its harsh form. It was the
director’s vision for a world that is close to the real world and it cherishes heroes
that are not heroes in the traditional perspective. But El Lemby and his fellows are
the creation of one man: Mohamed Saad. The character eats the film. And its
image is presented exactly as it is, without any external vision” 181
Despite the increasingly unequal realities that the poor classes in Egypt struggle
with, the systemic deterioration of the political and socioeconomic conditions in Egypt
created a common language that a broader range of social classes share. Without
substantial changes in the economic situation of the poor in Egypt, that may be even
worsening 182, their participation in the political sphere relatively increased after several
sit-ins were carried out and were covered by the Egyptian media. From another angle, the
constantly nurtured sense of threat by the ashwaiyyat, drowning in poverty and chaos,
propelled a collective keenness among the upper classes to call for a fair resolution of
their inhumane life conditions. Media professionals had to find a more appealing formula
to profit from this invasion of the media by ashwaiyyat residents. The noble cause of
delivering the suffering of those people to the circles of decision-makers was not the only
reason behind the increased representation. Tarek Al Shinawi elaborates:
“It is not only about art, there is a mere commercial dimension in making such
films, the middle class created characters from ashwaiyyat instead of making
middle class characters to say ‘we have those weird creatures’, the audience wants
to see them transformed into ‘creatures’ and you (as producer) want to please
them more than speak about real problems” 183
My interest in the following paragraphs is to analyze how Heen Maysara and El
Lemby achieved such a big success and appealed to the middle and upper classes in
Egypt. In addition to the analysis I presented in chapter four for the commonalities shared
by the middle class and ashwaiyyat residents, this chapter focuses on the simultaneous
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disgust and appeal that surrounded the two films. The reasons for such contradictory
stances are explicable through highlighting how the film makers in both movies created a
stage against which the seemingly shocking scenes were presented, what I refere to below
as the “necessary balances.” I then offer an interpretation of the reactions (through my
ethnographic sample) of the audience to provide the reader with more insights about the
socio-cultural roots of the films’ success.

5.3. Necessary Balances

In 2004, Kanaan Makiya wrote his account on artistic representation in Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq. There he analyzes the difficult situation that governs artistic production
under despotic rule:
“Quentin Bell 184 says that ‘bad’ art is a form of insincerity, which results from
‘social pressure in favor of that which society at large calls beauty’. In the last one
hundred years, he claims, the good artist has always fought against the popular
conception of beauty while the bad artist has worked within its constraints.
Naturally, the president thinks of himself as the creator of a great work of art, not
a bad one, to this Bell retorts: ‘The damnable thing about bad art is that the
insincerity which lies at its roots is not perceived by the artist himself’ 185.
Makiya maps out in his work the pressures and determinants under a despotic repressive
regime that influence artistic production and transform its nature even subconsciously
without the artist’s awareness of them. In Heen Maysara, the director Khaled Youssef
claims a total responsibility and moreover finds necessary to present his film, which
embodies a harsh criticism of the ruling regime:
“Definitely the regime is to behold responsible for the status of chaos we live in
Egypt and the present rule is illegitimate and is not product of real democratic
elections. And whether this is apparent in my film or not I do imagine it that way,
and even away from the film, my opinion is that the government of NDP
(National Democratic Party) is the reason behind all the disasters of the country. It
is an authority that gives nothing and speaks since the eighties on the employment
of 5 million citizens and this did not happen. And also speaks about providing
housing and small projects and achieves nothing of this. In contrast, people are
184
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turning poorer and unemployed and we live in a society that made bribery a
legacy for living, bribes run the country” 186.
However, Youssef and Nasser Abd Alrahman were cautious while hitting at the
sensitive issues that would not appeal to their targeted audience (middle class and
government!!) or would cross the political red lines defined by the political regime. This
cautiou pushed them to compromises that pervaded their text with contradictory signs.
These contradictions rendered the singling out of ashwaiyyat residents’ as the only
marginal and excluded lot in society doubtful. In two principal axes of the film, this
caution is most clear. The first concerns situations of direct encounter with the Egyptian
security apparatus which will be discussed in details in the coming chapter. The second is
the representation of the upper and middle class characters in the film in their encounters
with the residents of ashwaiyyat.
Bearing in mind the receptive audience’ sensitivities, Youssef and Abd Al
Rahman presented a sharply polarized image of the upper class characters. The latter
were slotted either in extremely idealistic or evil models of representation. Although
Youssef emphasizes the despising public gaze towards homeless street adults, for
instance in the scene where Ayman and his wife are trying to sell flowers to two upper
class lovers, he did stress the tears of the woman who brought Ayman up when her
husband forced her to get rid of him after she got pregnant. Similarly, Youssef presented
the example of the old lady helping Nahed and embracing her warmly inside her house as
if it was a natural and expected behavior. Leila Abo Zeid 187 (53 years old) commented on
this scene: “I wouldn’t ever do it, and I don’t think anyone would, I can’t deal with them
to that extent; adopt a homeless child or take a homeless lady into my house, this is very
unrealistic. I was touched by the film but it is the role of the government to handle their
problems, what can I do?” May El Sayed in another interview agrees: “I think neither El
Lemby or Heen Maysara gave a realistic account of the middle class, or ‘us’ (with slight
mockery), it’s either very angelic view or very monstrous. The reaction of the sons after
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the old lady dies is more expectable, they will suspect the girl immediately and kick her
out.”
El Lemby producers, who had a better chance to hide behind the comic
performance of Saad and the light comedy plots, ended their film nevertheless with a
scene that appeared out of context. El Lemby appeared wearing his robe du chambre and
teaching his son the English alphabet on a blackboard. Borrowing only his body moves
and way of pronunciation from the original character, the scene (12 seconds) delivered a
sense of security to its audience: “Can we argue that this scene is also rebellious?!”
argued Myvel Seddik when I asked her whether she thinks that the film criticizes the
middle class traditions. The scene cannot be accepted as part and parcel of the film. It is
rather part, may be, of the wishful thinking of the film-makers who aspire that El
Lemby’s vulgarity is to be disciplined and refined. Belal Fadl 188 the famous scriptwriter
asserts:
“Wael Ehsan, the director, was a poor guy from Ismailia, and he has this
simplistic conviction that things would go very well when one makes some effort,
poverty can be easily overcome. Saad also comes from ‘Aleet El Kabsh’, also
ashwaiyyat, and he says that he lived with people exactly like El Lemby and
wanted to express how they long for a descent ‘normal’ life.”
In my judgment, the audience was not in need for such “balances” to confer
desirability on both films. In fact, the main point about both movies was the powerfulness
of their representation of the vulgarity that characterizes the behavior of all figures
including middle class characters. It is this storm of violence, offensiveness and
aggression seen in every detail of both movies – whether in the comic use of El Lemby of
his knife to threaten people who are certain he will never dare to hurt them, or how
simply a big fight is ignited from nothing in Heen Maysara – that was both shocking and
appealing. Tarek El Shenawi confirms this assumption:
“We all see variations of El Lemby in the Egyptian street, in schools and
universities and in the state employees, may be not that exaggerated but all of
them have inside something from El Lemby, there is a dangerous social impact
that we should be alert to; success this time was not a momentary identification
with a ‘character’ that has an expiry date, what Saad presented is not within a
frame of absurdity, El Lemby reached out to the most important sectors of the
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society because they wanted him, and if this is not true for those who pay the
tickets, it would have only been a moderate hit.” 189
5.4. Watching the decay of the ‘Modern’

The similarity or the common language that Al Shinawi assumes between El
Lemby and the audience can be interpreted as signs and signifieds that indicate a subtle
mockery of the failed or distorted modernity project of the Egyptian nation-state. The
audience presumably identified with a narrative that makes ‘truer’ the decay and
precariousness of the modern institutions that once were the most desired of ambitions of
the middle class. For example, the films announce news that Egyptians confront everyday
in their encounter with the institutions of law and education. El Lemby’s mother warns
him before getting to the exam of ‘erasing illiteracy’: “Your studying in your head, your
sandwiches in your bag and your knife in your pocket, if somebody asked to cheat cut
him into pieces”. The combination she made between acquiring a superficial education
(later we see her dictating the answers to her son in the microphone), guaranteeing food
and means of protection structures the everyday priorities in the Egyptian society
nowadays. Mohamed Samir (university student, 22 years old) states: “I am not sure if I
had a quarrel with a police officer who wants to detain me for no reason, arguing that
these are my constitutional rights as a citizen it will work, you can never be sure”.
Mohamed resumes: “A large number of my friends hold knives, they are wealthy and
potent, they have connections, but they want to guarantee maximum safety and they
know nobody can arrest them for this, in Heen Maysara they could arrest and torture
people because they are poor.”
El Lemby and Heen Maysara delineated this insecurity and absence of the modern
institutions that regulate this violence or that guarantee a minimum of respect and
humanity for the common person no matter what his/her class is. Making fun of the
notion of education, the brutalization by the police in El Lemby and demonstrating the
atrocities and torture in the police stations in Heen Maysara attracted the subordinated
audience. As Mbembe explains:
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“Enjoyment and need for assuagement are thus complementary and take various
forms: excess and intemperance, extravagance and dereliction, the capacity to set
limits (arbitrariness) and to breach them (transgression) - in short, apparent
facility with which, with a simple fiat, one can decide to set up anything or
abolish anything. So impunity reins. One lets it all hang out. One eats what there
is, with no care for the morrow” 190.
The “reign of impunity” is articulated in many areas of both films. Not only in the
series of events in Heen Maysara, starting from selling the child of Nahed and Hashisha
to a wealthy infertile family by a bus driver until the internal governance of the locality
by Hashisha (the notable thug that collects money to instate order and protection), but
also the easiness (or facility) and the settled tolerance for their occurrence. For example,
the number of times when Hashisha gets in and out of prison after the fabrication of false
or true minor crimes (by the police officer), were easily accepted by the rest of
inhabitants as part of the price of this relationship and becoming one of the notable
persons dealing with the security apparatus. On the other hand, giving birth to the love
child in the streets, homeless children excavating parking cars and stealing the laundry
from houses, Fathi who threatens to kill another resident if he does not agree to let him
marry his sister, the step-father who keeps harassing Nahed in front of her mother and the
frank and masked rape, all happened in Heen Maysara without any sort of interference
from the law institution with its visible executive branch (security apparatus) or its
abstract moral presence. Similarly in El Lemby, we could notice that drug trade and usage
of knives were presented as regular practices that hurt nobody. On the other hand, the
police officers (representatives of the state authority’s regulations) were constantly
provoked to prove all the attempts by El Lemby to earn a living as illegal requiring
detention.
In other scenes and plots in El Lemby an alternative discourse started to substitute
the dominant discourse of modernization that has been adopted by the state throughout
contemporary Egyptian history. Modernization that bears usually connotations of
progress, refinement, and the superiority of the educated or the cultural elite of the
society was the subject of many sarcastic scenes in El Lemby. The film portrayed El
Lemby in two different situations showing his despise for classical music (Western or
190
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Egyptian) and ‘modern’ dance as forms of ‘refined art’. Uncle Bach, a violin player in El
Lemby’s district, appears in one of the scenes trying persistently to force El Lemby to
listen to him playing a part of a violin concerto telling him: “I am cleaning your ears”. El
Lemby with utter confidence starts to listen and commented (always in his stoned tone):
“It is disgusting, I can’t stand.” El Lemby decides to leave the house and Bach keeps
tracking him with his violin to bring the scene to a point where El Lemby reverses the
common rhetoric from respect to Uncle Bach’s music as a form of refinement while he is
escaping the nauseating repellent music. El Lemby was declaring that such a respect is
also decaying.
In contrast, the film depicted El Lemby at his wedding (with all his quarter
neighbors invited, with everybody drinking beer and smoking hash) singing: “Go away
cock, this chick is not yours” (teasing the ex-fiancée of his wife) and dancing hilariously
with his typical belly and butt moves. The song used the melody of a famous song of Um
Kulthum “Hob Eih?” (What love?), but changed the lyrics to invoke cynical and
sensational meanings. It announces another form of music that the hero likes and sings
with ecstasy and enchantment. El Lemby used these lyrics instead of Um Kulthum’s and
danced at his wedding, instead of a ‘modern’ dance professional that is supposed to dance
for his invitees.
The character of the modern dancer hired to dance at weddings taking place in a
popular quarter is another representation, in my view, of the decline of the modernization
discourse. El Lemby had this chat with the dancer where they were shown clearly
speaking two different languages as if coming from totally different worlds. El Lemby
asks her about the belly dancing suit that she is supposed to wear and ‘seduce’ all the
invitees (as he said). The dancer, wearing glasses, black blouse and trousers, tells El
Lemby that she feels she cannot make a modern dance performance for those ‘weird’
people as ‘she doubts that any of them has an email address or an ICQ account!!’. Two
people were represented as not belonging to the same rhetoric, as possessing opposing
histories and referential points. El Lemby and Uncle Bach or El Lemby and the dancer
were coupled in those scenes as two opposite discourses or two contradictory currents of
thought; yet in both scenes only the hero has an upper hand. For the audience who
praised El Lemby’s cynicism, the refinement claimed by the modern social institutions is
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more of a formality that did not inscribe itself in their practices. Their disgust of the belly
and butt moves of El Lemby hides a deeper level of desire to transgress this discourse and
admit its limited influence on their lives.
5.5. Vulgarity, Violence and Laughter
While the mockery of the failed modernity project that once stood on the
shoulders of a burgeoning middle class is one pillar of the big success of Heen Maysara
and El Lemby, the transgression of this middle class’ appropriated behavior and moral
discourse would be the second pillar. The physical performance of Saad in El Lemby and
the sex scenes in Heen Maysara would be a good example of how the audience met such
a violation of its moral code with a mixture of desire and disgust.
Saad’s performance presents an image of an exorbitantly transgressive material
(given his movements of belly and the excessive use of his butt). This trend of ‘male’
movements (which makes it even more intolerable in common Egyptian culture) spread
lately among some shaabi singers like Saad Al Saghir and Emad Baarour 191 and
positioned the body as “the principal locale of the idioms and fantasies used in depicting
power” as Mbembe claims 192. Such transgression is necessarily attractive to the subject
(in this case cinema audience) that realizes through Saad’s bodily movements the
possibility of exceeding the norm. Trouillot argues:
“If the magnetism of the grotesque indeed generates conflict between attraction
and disgust it is exactly because attraction and disgust are driven here by the same
force: ego’s recognition that a scene otherwise familiar has been pushed to the
extremes of abnormality.” 193
Saad’s vulgar body movements speak to the implicit desires of exceeding
appropriate behavior and challenging the essential assumptions that institutionalize its
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domination. Nurturing the rival fantasies of vulgarity inside the souls of the Egyptian
audience watching El Lemby can be regarded as the other side of the coin of the assumed
power of the modernization discourse which is, allegorically, the power of the state. The
character in El Lemby embodies other features of the ruling power aside from its adoption
of the modernity slogans, namely its obscenity and vulgarity. The ability of such power to
exceed and transcend the limits of the social restrictions is the clearest evidence of its
omnipotence and sovereignty. As Trouillot argues, “The imagery of power is excess.
Excess, in turn, breeds vulgarity” 194. Saad, who extravagantly simulated the Egyptian
social reality where power abuse and violence are essential features, unconsciously
reinstates this discourse of vulgar deployment of power through his transgressive body
movements. The middle class viewers who created the icon of El Lemby participate, in
one way or another, in reproducing a simulation of the power relations between different
classes in Egypt.
Mbembe traces the correlation between the banality of power and the aesthetics
of vulgarity in the postcolonial state of Cameroon. He presumes that there is no clear
distinction between the producers and the receivers of the dominant public discourse. He
further argues that the dominant forces together with the dominated ones “reproduce the
de facto power relations through the continuous processes of simulation”. Mbembe
considers not only the way in which power lays claim to its subjects through coercion and
violence, but also how that “coercive power compels its subjects to rearticulate that
power, to confer grandeur on that power, and to do this through a convivial participation
in simulation of that power." 195Mbembe identifies this ‘conviviality’ as the guarantee to
preserve the subjection and submission of the postcolonial state subjects. This
conviviality unifies the rulers and the ruled under a practical system of signs and
metaphors of mutual appreciation and apprehension (simulacrum) that end up by robbing
both parties of their vitality. These vulgar practices of the subordinated subjects become a
node in the chain of the official world’s obscenity where the dominant and the dominated
are inscribed within the same episteme 196.
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It is within the space of representation that the traditional subjects of the state
were allowed a chance to simulate the power agents and reproduce their discourse and
their violent practices and even to make fun of all that. Mbembe viewed the post-colony
as the ‘chaotically pluralistic’ space where the dominated inscribe and reproduce the
patterns of violence and coercion by the state power.
This would be the case with the claimed powerfulness of Hashisha in Heen
Maysara and of El Lemby in El Lemby. Despite all his sufferings and repeated failures,
El Lemby preserves a sense of dignity and an unexplained self confidence. After coming
back from Sharm El Sheikh and the failure of his project to rent bicycles for tourists
(illegal as usual), El Lemby says to his mother: “I am still El Lemby, the man which an
earthquake that shakes entire Egypt do not dare shake him”. However, El Lemby
combined this sense of powerfulness (always artificial and exaggerated) with a
corresponding modesty and low self-esteem that surge up in all the situations of his
frustration: “In the bottom of his heart he feels he is great, for no reason, he is illiterate,
ignorant and a complete looser, yet he thinks he can handle everything with the knife”,
comments Mohamed Samir, 21 years old, faculty of commerce student.
This defensive attitude of El Lemby speaks on behalf of his audience and
represents its “neurotic ego” that Anna Freud describes in her account of the mechanisms
of defense:
“When the ego is young and plastic, its withdrawal from one field of activity is
sometimes compensated for by excellence in another, upon which it concentrates.
But, when it has become rigid or has already acquired an intolerance of ‘pain’ and
so is obsessionally fixated to a method of flight, such withdrawal is punished by
impaired development. By abandoning one position after another, it becomes one
sided, looses too many interests and can show but a meager achievement.” 197
The defensive accent of El Lemby assuming unlimited power and capacity (‘I
would destroy the world and burn the whole district’) is probably his own way to
negotiate his submissiveness to incredible levels of exclusion and violence. The grandeur
that he preserves in all the humiliating situations he encounters (‘you want El Lemby
work as a peddler and sell sandwiches?’) is part of the image of heroism that he survives
in an imaginary trajectory against the classicist arrogant discourse of upper classes and
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the brutality of the state. The fantasy of heroism is the compensatory mechanism that El
Lemby presented to the whole society facing the same brutality. The psychoanalyst Khalil
Fadil argues:
“Mohamed Saad or El Lemby is not a real psychopath, he is a hazy image of him,
the criminal psychopath is those who fled with the billions of the country, the
authority abusers and the cruel corrupt whales who eat everything, those who
sexually harass all bodies and souls while struggling for earning their living. El
Lemby is a social ‘homosapien’ present among us, inside and around us. He has a
network of relations with people in ashwaiyyat, in the country and in the city.
From his figure, voice and way of pronunciation, he constitutes an
independent structure that can be called ‘the Lemby structure’. It is present all
over Egypt and has its tools and environment and its way in sneaking into the
social life of all classes, starting from the poor that Saad represents not ending by
those who see him disgusting but love his harshness and irony full heartedly.
El Lemby grasps in his dirty hands the smell of our violent animalistic
social behavior that we practice against each other. The behavior that extends
from body movements to sexual harassment in the streets which makes us like
animals that appreciate vulgar behaviors… While all of us suffering from
emotional austerity and the unjustifiably swollen ego, Saad and Wael Ehsan
succeed to synthesize that disenfranchised sad psychopath and fail to actualize a
real human being with assimilated emotions and moralities” 198
Fadel points out how El Lemby presented a weak character that borrows only the
superficial features of grotesque power. His weakness is probably behind the empathy
and identification of his audience with his case that may simulate theirs too. However, El
Lemby represents an easy remedy for the inability to express or resist the violence they
confront. While the upper classes are stuck with their predicament between decline and
ascension, crackling with laughter on the ‘social homosapien’ seems a way to displace
the fears from the dissemination of ‘El Lemby structure’ in all the institutions that used to
guarantee their privileged position. This extreme polarization, obvious in Fadel’s
analysis, of the society between those who acquire animalistic behavior and those who
acquire a human one conveys the worries that infuse the social imaginary with loathe to
El Lemby. Such a violent radical metaphor (animalistic) is meant to protect the middle
class hegemony on the vocabulary of the cultural discourse and ensure a safe position
under the umbrella of grotesque power. The producers of El Lemby helped the audience
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to laugh at one’s demoralized ego and forget about their subordination to the state, while
excited with a temporary victory in the contest between classes.
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Chapter Six
The Security Apparatus: Only in Ashwaiyyat?
6.1. Introduction
One of the remarkable elements in the representation of social reality in Heen
Maysara and El Lemby was essentializing the role of the police institution in structuring
both the public and private lives of the characters. In both films police officers and
stations materialize as the primary site where state presence and control are articulated
and manifested. It is also the police institution that interferes in all matters of daily life in
ashwaiyyat to ensure a minimum of security and order, thus guarding the status quo. The
assertion of such a presence can be better viewed within the framework of the maximized
power and authoritarianism of the official security apparatus in Egypt over the last
decades. Saif Nasrawi 199 points out that the security apparatus, especially those
establishments which are politically-oriented such as Mabahith Aman al-Dawla (State
Security Investigation Apparatus, SSIA), al-Aman al-Markazi (the Central Security
Forces), al-Mukhabarat al-‘Aama (the Intelligence), and Maglis al-Amn al-Qawmi (the
National Security Council) have assumed an increasing role during Mubarak’s reign.
The Egyptian security apparatuses, according to Nasrawi, exercise their hegemony,
control and discipline on almost all domains of public sphere: institutional and uninstitutional, formal and informal, and governmental and societal:
“These apparatuses control and manipulate the bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the
parliament, the economy, universities, political parties, professional syndicates,
trade unions, NGOs, the press, churches, mosques, the Internet and public
morality. Their influence also extends to foreign policy, diplomacy and
international trade. Occupying such a pivotal role within the regime, the security
apparatus is the largest entity in terms of membership in the state’s bureaucracy.
Their membership has been estimated between 950,000 and 1,100,000 persons.
And their share in the annual budget comes only second to that of the army and by
far larger than the government’s expenditure on health and education” 200
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Nasrawi describes how the politics of fear became more essential to establish an absolute
domination of the security apparatus over public life under Mubarak’s rule:
“Capitalizing on a radical notion of nationalism, the security apparatus projects
itself beyond the scope of class politics; thus, it positions itself as keeping a
distance from any social group by representing a neutral and rational façade. This
role is further enhanced by continuous dissemination of conspiracy theories about
imaginary enemies, domestic and foreign who are trying to “tarnish the image of
Egypt”, “revoke external intervention” and so on. Consequently, a state of fear
must be always fed continuously to strengthen the grip of the security apparatuses
over the Egyptians’ bodies and souls. The politics of fear can be felt directly
through police’s abuse, harassment and torture in streets, demonstrations,
detention centers and prisoners and indirectly by nurturing a state of uncertainty
and unpredictability about so many affairs in life such as appointments in the
bureaucracy, the judiciary and the army, getting different licenses to start a
business, to establish a voluntary association, to found a newspaper and even to
install an electricity meter in your house” 201.
Lately, the Egyptian media disclosed the processes of regular torture of lay
persons, including females, in the police stations. The most widely covered torture
incident in Egypt recently was the case of Eimad El-Kabir, a mini-bus driver who was
brutally and sexually assaulted in a police station after quarrelling with a police officer.
Such a blunt declaration of torture heightened national and international awareness of the
immensity and brutality of the Egyptian security apparatus. Yet, we have no data to
confirm whether this disclosure assisted in the propagation or the resistance to the politics
of fear deployed by the political regime. Disseminating such information is one of the
most prominent indicators of the state violating the social codes of legitimate violence
and exceeding the previous limits to its authoritarianism. This pattern of authoritarianism
was stressed many times in El Lemby and Heen Maysara which presented the scene of
torture of Hashisha’s family in the police station including sexually harassing his mother
and Fathi’s wife to oblige him to admit a connection to the Islamist militant groups in his
district and to Al Qaeda as well!!
However, this presence of the state remains incomplete if it was not for a network
of relations with notables from the ashwaiyy district, whose task is to monitor and
facilitate the everyday activities inside the district without direct interference of the
201
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police. Salwa Ismail identifies the emerging alternative of local governance created by
the inclusion of the notables (like Hashisha in his district) and promoting them as figures
of authority:
“Through state authorities’ incorporation of the lesser notables and through the
farming out of positions of authority, an urban regime of government is
actualized. Politics in the sense of action is taken to affect the conduct of
government as a form of mediation rather than representation. This image of the
state and such incorporation into the system of government underscores a mode of
operation characterized by improvisation. It would be difficult to prescribe a
unitary logic to how local government is managed on daily basis” 202
Such an improvised model of governance was presented in Heen Maysara as the
form that suits the half hazard space with all the disorganization that characterizes its
system. Similarly, the violent practices and the prejudiced judgments of police officers
were justified as mechanisms to reduce the potential hazards and crimes of the residents
and prevent their expansion outside the boundaries of that locality. Again, the
representation of the behavior of the police in the films (especially Heen Maysara)
affirms the common assumptions about the ashwaiyyat as spaces that incubate criminals,
thugs and Islamist fanatics, threatening to disturb the peace of the middle class
neighborhoods.
The films induce another sort of submissiveness to the prevalent discourses about
ashwaiyyat when it restricts such a brutal behavior of the police to the ashwaiyyat and
their residents. In Heen Maysara, the police actions are all represented as reactionary to
the massive violence and thuggery that prevail in the district. Detention and the
deployment of exceptional laws (in torture for example) are justified as prophylactic
measures that guard the safety of the whole society from Baltaggiya (thugs) and fanatics
dwelling in ashwaiyyat. The police officers were always looking at Hashisha as the
despised agent that they use only to reach for the fanatics hiding in “ashwaiyy mazes”
they cannot invade.
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The discourse articulated by the head officers to express why they rely on
Hashisha as a murshid (guide) for the police reproduces the spatial frameworks of
classification that do not perceive ashwaiyyat as recognizable urban spaces. In a scene
where the senior officer yells at the junior officer after his arrest of Hashisha, he ties the
presence of the state inside the district to the role of Hashisha because without ‘one like
him’ (in his words), the officer would lose his track and be unable to reach the terrorists
hiding inside ashwaiyyat’. Assef Bayat explores how such a spatial perception of
ashwaiyyat contributes to the political discourse around them as non-modern ‘abnormal
sites which provide housing for ‘abnormal’ people:

“Indeed, the strict official definition of what consists an urban unit and the
invention of the concept of ahswaiyyat as a political category tend to produce new
spatial divisions which excludes many citizens from urban participation. The
ashwaiyyat are perceived as ‘abnormal’ places where, in modern conventional
wisdom, the ‘non- modern’ and thus ‘non- urban’ people, that is, the villagers, the
traditionalists, the non- conformists and the unintegrated live. It is indeed
puzzling that over 20 percent of all Egypt’s and half of greater Cairo’s
populations, who reside in ashwaiyyat, are considered outsiders, living in
‘abnormal’ conditions” 203

6.2. Eliminating Danger or Institutionalizing Baltaga?
The sequence of events in Hashisha’s life put him in direct interface with security
forces. The situations differed as did his position: from drug dealer to police guide and
notable of the district ending eventually to work against the police after the atrocious
torture of his family at the police station. These encounters reflect in different situations
the structures of thought behind the behavior of the security forces when dealing with
ashwaiyyat. Hashisha’s life is long journey trying to acquire money and notability. He
started by joining a big drug dealer’s network but failed to keep the amount of drugs he
had to distribute (after smoking some of it with his friend Fathi). The head of the drug
group ordered his followers to beat Hashisha and report him to the security forces. The
police officer made a deal with Hashisha to provide him protection in return for
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monitoring and reporting all the activities of the drug dealers and Islamist fanatics in the
area. Based on that agreement, Hashisha was released from the prison to engage in a
bloody battle with swords and knives against the followers of the big drug dealer. The
battle ended with Hashisha being declared as the local governor of his district that
practices a mixed role between Futtuwah and Baltagi 204 (thug). This role implies, as
Salwa Ismail explains, agency for the state, interference in fights and monitoring the
moral conduct of the residents.
Such an incorporation of the thugs in the security apparatus became part of
institutionalizing the customary rule of force instead of the rule of law. This substitution
is based on a set of emergency laws that guarantee an absolute power for the security
apparatus to instate the rule of exception. Acquiring such an absolute power went through
phases in the last decades of Mubarak’s rule. In the following section, I will explain these
phases.
It is well known that after the assassination of Anwar Al Sadat in 1981, the ruling
regime under the leadership of Mubarak declared the implementation of the emergency
law that still governs the Egyptian public and political life until now. The emergency rule
provides the regime with the legal right to control every level of political activity. As a
result, the government is entitled to censor activities including freedom of expression and
freedom of assembly which include the right to censor, seize, or confiscate letters,
newspapers, newsletters, publications, and all other means of expression and advertising
before they are published. President Mubarak argues that the renewal of the emergency
law is necessary in order to confront terrorism and protect democracy and stability. Yet,
the law is used to contain and control not just terrorism but also legitimate political
activities.
Before he started his fifth term in office in 2005 Mubarak promised more
democracy. But despite some changes, for instance allowing a more critical, privately
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owned press to flourish, his regime has systematically whittled away civic freedoms 205.
In May 2008, for instance, the government abruptly extended for two years the official
state of emergency, saying that new antiterrorism laws were not yet ready. The
emergency laws, which are meant to be applied only against violent threats to the state,
have in fact been wielded against every manner of dissent. In one form or another they
have been in force for all but three of the past 50 years. Furthermore, the state has
surveilled and carried out a series of structural constitutional amendments that enforce the
government’s control and pave the way for a complete hegemony of the ruling National
Democratic Party. The most prominent of these amendments was article 76 concerning
the regulation of future presidential elections which set harsh terms planned to exclude
any potential opposition candidate from running to the post 206.
In addition to the constitutional amendments and the oppressive emergency laws,
the Egyptian juridical system since 1952 was designed to guarantee unlimited authority
for the executive branch of the state especially the president. Nasrawi claims:
“The 1971 constitution, for instance, allows the president to control the
bureaucracy, the government, the judiciary and the army through both legislation
and appointment. In this context, the security officers always recommend specific
people who are loyal to the regime to fill in the important positions within the
state. Simultaneously, the regulations of any state’s institutes were engineered to
provide its power holders with unlimited authorities. Thus, the president appoints
the minister of justice, who in turn, is responsible for appointing and dismissing
judges, allowing bonuses and promotions and tens of different powers. The same
applies for universities, governorates, local governments and almost every
organization within the state. Eventually, these power holders, who have been
largely appointed in their positions according to security recommendation reports,
have acted as the invisible hand of the regime and its security apparatus. In this
sense, certain judges, for example, are positioned in the sensitive electoral centers
to ensure the chances of government’s candidate to win, or referring sensitive
lawsuits to specific loyal judges, and so on” 207
The unlimited authority given to state administrators encouraged them to
transcend the official regulations and resort to exceptional laws, implementing them in
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non-exceptional situations. Instating the rule of exception consequently legitimized the
prevalence of an informal law that perpetuates chaos and impunity.
6. 3. Becoming Notable… Becoming Hero
Becoming ‘notables’ of the half-hazard district is part of the heroism that the main
characters in Heen Maysara and El Lemby claim, thus signaling a new form of selfactualization that emerged under violent and bare conditions of life. It is a window of
opportunity that allowed the paupers relative control on their private lives that are too
trivial, yet complex, for the state to interfere to manage. Heen Maysara and El Lemby
represented a society that possesses a mechanism of internal governance unbound by the
modern institutions. Hence, the films embodied a criticism of the hegemonic discourse
about the full control of the state over the everyday life of ashwaiyyat residents. The way
Hashisha continued in his relationship with the police officer is telling about the role of
minor agents in formulating the state’s moral presence despite of its disengagement from
running the daily life matters deploying laws and regulations.
Gradually Hashisha starts to acquire importance for the bosses of the junior police
officer. They order him to work on monitoring the Islamist groups in the district (‘Drugs
are not important, those people with beards should be controlled’). This acquired
importance provoked the young officer who noticed that Hashisha is becoming more
arrogant and manipulative in their man-to-man encounters. The officer fabricated a drug
dealing case for Hashisha and arrested him. He was sentenced five years in prison which
raised the rage of the senior officer who gave a long speech about how the arrogance and
jealousy of the junior officer made him commit a fatal mistake and lose an important eye
of the police in the district.
After the release of Hashisha the police officer goes further in persecuting
Hashisha and receives information that his brother is a member of Al Qaeda. The officer
detained Hashisha’s mother and all of his acquaintances like Fathi and his wives and
tortured them using dogs, electricity and sexual harassment to force them to admit that
membership. Hashisha, affected by the humiliating scene of torture, swears to take
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revenge from the officer. He arranges with the leader of the Islamist group in the district
to make an ambush of the police forces for a big sum of money. The security forces reach
the district after the militants placed explosives everywhere. Hashisha succeeds to kidnap
the officer and threaten to kill him. The officer surrenders and begs Hashisha to let him
live and handled him his gun with his head down. Hashisha says: “Now, I took my
revenge”. Additional security forces reached the district and ordered the residents to
evacuate the place because there is a ‘political decision’ to remove it with bulldozers. The
leader of the Islamist group give orders to explode the district and escapes at the end of
the film.
The story of Hashisha demonstrates partly the precariousness of the state’s image
as it identifies the haphazardness and the utter violence used in managing dangerous
situations. The film also shows how the unlimited authority given to state officers
encouraged them to transcend the formal regulations and resort to exceptional laws,
implementing them in non-exceptional situations. Instating the rule of exception
consequently legitimized the prevalence of an informal law that perpetuates chaos and
impunity. Mohamed Said argues:
“They are not laws in the real meaning of the word; a general statement that
regulates similar cases or phenomena. They are political orders aiming at
granting the political system an advantage in every single subject, denying the
opponents the chance to get any plus even by using force, banning any sort of
political activity and bridging every gap in the schema of ironic control on the
public field. That is why all the legislations of the despotic system are extremely
punishing, very long and badly formulated to ease the criminalization of
ordinary comportments if needed. This kinky philosophy legitimized chaos and
made it impossible for state employees to use their minds or depend on a
juridical reference, because the legislative authority is even more ignorant than
the executive one, and their cooperation produces a real catastrophe” 208

208

. Said, Mohamed. 2008. “The state and the chaos” in Al Badeel newspaper, April 2008.

105

6.4. The Fragmented State Presence and Resistance
Mapping out the brutality and uncertainty that characterize the behavior of the
security apparatus in Egypt was also part of El Lemby’s subtext. The representatives of
the apparatus are provoked, in a selective fashion, to arrest poor peddlers and impede the
accomplishment of any simple dream of El Lemby. However, they never show up in the
violent battles among residents with knives or in the drug smoking spaces. The apparatus
was portrayed as part of the fragmented state that is not practicing violence towards its
subjects to instate order and security. In contrast, the apparatus delivers a contradictory
message that make of the absolute state control more of an elusive discourse deployed
only to apply more violence and exclusion towards the disenfranchised.
It is noticeable in El Lemby and Heen Maysara that the united construct of the
state never exists, it is rather represented. The effect that the state agents produce on daily
basis is the only proof on the existence of such power (detention, fabricated crimes,
torture…). Timothy Mitchell 209 studies ‘the state as effect’ and stresses the elusive
character of the state’s existence. Joel S. Migdal 210 goes further when he suggests that
some counterpractices and contradictory processes can destabilize this construct in a
similar fashion. Ismail elaborates on this idea in relation to the Egyptian context:

“We should pay attention not only to the practices that produce the image of the
state as an all powerful agent, but also to those that undermine this image. In this
sense, I suggest that while certain rituals of state power bring citizens up to the
state’s majesty others bring them around to see its broken nature. As such, I
analyze the citizens’ encounters with the everyday state as rituals of power that
bring the state down to the people and, in so doing, may occasion ridicule,
contempt and derision” 211.
In my opinion, media representations are part of this process of deconstruction of
the public gaze of the unitary construct of the state. On the one hand, they confer a
specific significance (appreciation, apprehension, conviviality, etc…) in the dramatic
209
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plots of daily micro-processes where subjects encounter state officials and administrators.
Also, they expose the fragmentation of the mythical power of the state and propose
different alternatives to the dominant script. Hence, the symbolic power of representation
is the ability to challenge the hegemonic discourse and assimilating the minor
counterpractices of the daily life into an awareness of the processes of control and
dominance on the social activity exerted by the state.
However, we should not rush to conclude that this assimilation process that
happens when viewers watch a film or a documentary empower their resistance
strategies. We should even think about the contrary that such a representation may
invoke, in my opinion, a temporary response like laughter or anger which may impede
the conscious acts of resistance that may happen in reality. Mbembe contends:
“The question of whether humor in the ‘postcolony’ is an expression of
‘resistance’ or not, whether it is, a priori, opposition, or simply manifestation of
hostility toward authority, is thus of secondary importance. For the most part,
those who laugh are only reading the signs left, like rubbish, in the wake of the
commandment.” 212
6.5. Romanticizing subordination: We hate you… we’ll keep serving you

Infusing the social imaginary with representations where the powerful state is
fragmented and deconstructed may perpetuate the inability of the subordinates to resist.
In my opinion Heen Maysara and El Lemby made of the repressive measures and
grotesque control of the state over the daily minor practices of its subjects a naturalized
fact of life. Representing the subjects in their everyday as working around the institutions
of domination rather than questioning their brutality (like Hashisha) reproduces the
imagery of the state as the ‘total cosmology’ that even the counterpractices (claimed by
Migdal) occur under its umbrella. Fitting in the matrix of the corrupt ruler and engaging
in survival strategies can hardly qualify as resistance, as Salwa Ismail states 213.
From this perspective, it is hard to imagine through the representation of the
police institution in both films that the uncertainty and shakiness of the state imagery is
212
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consistent and that the narratives of resistance embedded in the texts can become ‘true’.
Finding a unifying logic for the performance of the state and the subordinates turns to be
an unattainable endeavor. All the signs, signifiers and signifieds in these representations
should be read versus a background of the ‘chaotically pluralistic’ space of their
formation. According to Mbembe:
“It is in practice impossible to create a single, permanently stable out of all the
signs, images, and markers current in the postcolony; this is why they are
constantly being shaped and reshaped, as much by the rulers as by the ruled, in
attempts to rewrite the mythologies of power. This is why; too, the postcolony is,
per excellence, a hollow pretense, a regime of unreality (regime du simulacra). By
making it possible to play and have fun outside the limits set by officialdom, the
very fact that the regime is a sham allows ordinary people to simulate adherence
to the innumerable official rituals that life in the postcolony requires” 214
The finale of Heen Maysara makes a good example of the disturbed system of
signifieds in the representation of the official institution and its incorporated subjects.
The rebellious hero succeeds to challenge the institution in a very strong symbolic
metaphor in the scene with the officer begging for his life and handling his gun (here
symbolic of giving up control and a subversion of the power relations). There are even
claims that the Ministry of Interior interfered to shorten this scene and remove the part
where the officer falls on his knees, which Youssef interprets as follows:
“I would cut the hands that censor any scene in my movies or any other sort of
artistic creativity product, the censorship apparatus had some logical remarks on
the film, like when the officer falls on his knees to not create a problem with the
police institution, then I agreed to write a thankful note on the final titer for the
police because I do really appreciate their role and do not want the situation to
become a chaos. Eventually, we resort to the police in situations of
disorganization even if this institution oppresses and punishes its ‘sons’ when
they exceed the limits…” 215
Youssef keeps sending contradictory messages about his challenge of the
authorities, while positioning himself within its boundaries and hence admits the
necessity of the deployment of oppression and violence selectively. Youssef says that we
are the ‘sons’ of the security apparatus that engulfs the state and this father consequently
214
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has the right to discipline its sons no matter what way he uses. In the final titer, Youssef
did not only thank the apparatus that exploded the ashwaiyy district and its people one
minute ago, but also put the following song imbued with metaphors of submissiveness
disguised under the noble romantic love of homeland:

We are the ones who protect her in hard times,
And we are the forgotten in times of joy,
When it sinks, only us who save her,
And when it’s safe, we bent under its heaviness,
We are the victims of love and duty,
The eye will never be above the eyebrows,
It is her love that inhabits our blood…

The song romanticizes the subordination of the poor under slogans of patriotism
(usually ‘her’ is interpreted as Egypt in many artistic metaphors). It sums up the message
of Youssef: “the threat of ashwaiyyat can be overcome when the state/the father have
some ‘intelligence’ to contain the repressed anger before it explodes.” 216
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Conclusion
I argue in this thesis that Heen Maysara and El Lemby provided me a tool to read
how contemporary Egyptian middle class perceive their social reality. Gazing through the
different parts of both films was rather similar to having a journey in the social imaginary
of this class with all the nuances and diversity it holds. It was also part of examining the
deep reasons behind shifts in the relationship, on the level of social discourse, between
the poor classes and the well-off ones, a shift from tolerance and sympathy in the last
decades to hostility and aggression in the 2000s. Considering myself a member of the
middle class, I had the urge to further interrogate the violence, which I catch myself
practicing sometimes, and which had become part and parcel of daily life in
contemporary Egypt. And when I contemplated the arenas where this violence is most
explicit and grotesque, I could not detach the state policies from the picture and I
reviewed what appears like an implicit class conflict within a larger sociopolitical
framework that invokes the most aggressive formulae of coexistence and social
interaction between people in the Egyptian society.
I followed media productions that gradually pulled the causes of the poor and
ashwaiyyat into the circle of light and adopted a well-determined discourse about finding
solutions for them. I kept observing how this discourse took different forms starting from
a populist political debate in talk shows and newspapers and rearticulated in both tragic
and comic film treatments like Heen Maysara and El Lemby. I found that in both films
the construction of the character of the poor took it to the most extreme of views and
imaginations. Regardless of whether the depiction was meant to ignite laughter or tears,
both films presented being poor or living in ashwaiyyat as the most distorting and
destructive living experience. In both films, the plots essentialized class position and
location as the only perspective according to which the characters and their comportment
could be judged. Consequently, a set of distinctive and class racist signs and signifieds
were disguised behind a shallow moralistic justification always relying on poverty and
dwelling in ashwaiyyat.
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Hence, I started to wonder whether this representation of the “catastrophe” of
being poor or living in ashwaiyyat is exclusive to these groups of people or it is more of a
mirror image of the anxiety of the middle class producers and consumers entangled in a
complex predicament. The features of the predicament were also obvious in the media
discourse that ran in parallel to defending the rights of the poor and talking about the
horrors in ashwaiyyat. The themes of the shrinkage of middle class, the chaos infiltrating
social institutions and the absence of the rule of law also dominated the social debate and
the headlines of newspapers.
I aimed at disclosing the nexus of relations embedded in these cinematic
treatments where the characters from upper and lower classes are coercively situated in a
chaotic context. At this nexus, the performance of the ruling regime and the sociopolitical
history of the postcolonial state in Egypt were highlightened as cornerstone in the
formation of the precarious moment Egyptians survive nowadays. I meant to refer to the
backgrounds that reinforced the sense of absurdity and founded the social and political
discourses that underpinned violence from the state against its citizens and paved the way
for an absolute subordination of the state subjects from 1952 till now.
Reviewing the films and the reactions of the audience I explored how processes of
social exclusion and societal violence have been intimately related to the reality of
deprivation from political freedoms and citizenship rights for successive decades (19522008). I could also see as a more tangible fact the connection between creating an
indigent and repressive political environment and distorting the very basic human
features. In my opinion, El Lemby or Hashisha were not fundamentally lacking money or
education, they rather lacked the conception of all relations and regulations through
which money or education become valuable and functional tools for survival and social
interaction. Reaching such a level of absurdity is an abstract representation not a complex
realistic treatment; however, it looked like the easiest and effortless way to represent the
reality of impunity that rendered the characters simultaneously powerless and careless in
both films.
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With an extremist representation of the poor, the producers of both movies
targeted the middle class groups who face a serious existential challenge due to the rearrangement of their position in the contemporary economic and sociopolitical condition.
And by stimulating a temporary shallow empathy, the targeted audience was guided to
realize the impossibility of a safe coexistence with the marginalized disintegrated groups
dwelling in ashwaiyyat. Such empathy masked a deeper level of hostility that I tackled in
my interviews and analysis. In different parts of this ethnography, I depicted the
underlying disgust and aggression towards the poor on the part of audience, cultural elite,
and critics of the Egyptian middle class.
I also focused on how the producers of the middle class social imaginary in Egypt
succeed in diverting and displacing the state/citizen relationship model to become
applicable to the relation between upper and lower classes. In many situations in the films
the storyline justified the brutal and grotesque interference of the police and state
administrators in structuring the daily life of the poor dwellers of ashwaiyyat.
Juxtaposing such interference to the utter dominance of the state security apparatus on the
public life of the upper classes, we come to notice that it never made the hot topic of
media productions or talk shows in the 2000s as ashwaiyyat and their hazardous impact
on society did.
I attempted to be impartial in presenting the diversified stances of the audience
and critics of the films, especially with regard to their impressions about the
representation of the poor. I highlighted the reactions of individuals from different
positions expressing sometimes opposing points of view. However, I was obviously
inclined to criticize and interrogate the “class racist” discourse that surged every now and
then in my ethnography. My criticism was based on reviewing these racist tendencies and
statements within the context of their construction and reinforcement. To achieve this, I
interrogated the history of the postcolonial state in Egypt and linked this history to the
academic literature about postcolonial state in Africa, which I consider a challenging
argument in this text.
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My contribution in this respect was essentially combining the academic
frameworks that described the anomalous state/citizens relationship in Egypt as a Middle
Eastern state particularity with those frameworks viewing it as one of the numerous
drawbacks of the “coloniality” of power in Africa. Emphasizing this combination in my
analytical framework, I presented my interpretation to the current sociopolitical
conditions and the widely controversial discourse about “chaos” in Egypt. Hence, I tried
to challenge the traditional categories that “interpretations of chaos” fall under and aimed
at presenting a more complex picture of social agents in their encounters and negotiations
of and with state power.
Eventually, I aspire that future academic projects can build on this contribution in
two principal ways. First, one contribution relates to the importance of reading widely
consumed media representations in relationship to contemporary social reality, in an
attempt to explore further the nexus between power and everyday life. The second
contribution concerns the necessity of finding new and creative perspectives to interpret
state/citizen relationships and dynamics in Egypt. The aim is to challenge traditional
assumptions about the reasons behind stagnation and disorder. I presume that presenting
an analysis of social reality in Egypt is greatly in need of an academic effort to unpack
the complexity it encounters with the hope of understanding the challenging phenomena
that is unfolding.
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